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DEMOCRATIZING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ROLE
OF A REGIONAL HOUSING LEGISLATURE IN THE
PRODUCTION OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Thomas A. Brown*

Economic, ethnic and racial residential segregationare ubiquitous across United
States metropolitan regions. As a result, the majority of affordable housing is located in central cities or inner-ring suburbs, generally in areas of highly
concentratedpoverty. Outer suburbs are often exempt from providing significant
housingfor the economically disadvantaged regionalcitizens. This should not be.
If housingpolicy in metropolitan regions were established in a democraticfashion,
the give-and-take of the political process would create strong incentives for regional
cooperation in the creation of affordable housing.Drawingtogether scholarship in
the fields of local government law, administrativelaw, and housing policy, this
Note proposes the creation of a RegionalHousing Legislature (RHL), a democratically elected body composed of representativesfrom each of the region's localities,
charged with establishinga coherent regional affordable housing policy. The existence of the RHL will diminish the contentiousnessof existing affordable housing
solutions by providing democratic legitimacy and by giving each locality a meaningful voice in the development of regional affordablehousing policy.

INTRODUCTION

The twin problems of affordable housing and racial and ethnic
segregation are among the most severe issues faced by our society.
In 1973, Anthony Downs wrote about the "un-American" implications of our society's systematic exclusion of the poor from the
suburbs, and the resulting highly concentrated poverty, uniformly
observable in cities across the United States.' Today, scholars recognize that the economic segregation described by Downs has an
even more insidious racial and ethnic element, in that many innercity poor neighborhoods are almost entirely African American and
Hispanic.
*
Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert E. Keeton, Senior United States DistrictJudge
for the District of Massachusetts; B.S. 1998, Yale University; J.D. 2003, Harvard Law School.
The author would like to thank Professor Gerald Frug for his comments throughout the
writing process, as well as for his inspiration and encouragement.
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This segregation has clear distributional consequences. In the
past few decades, the majority of unskilled jobs have moved to the
suburbs, rendering them inaccessible to the inner-city poor.3
Commuting by automobile is too expensive for such individuals;
and public transportation often does not reach these job sites.
Even when public transportation is available, it frequently takes an
inordinately long time rendering it either a non-option or, at
minimum, decreasing the number of hours for which the employee is paid.4 Moreover, inner-city residents have minimal
knowledge of job openings in the suburbs, or even which suburbs
are likely to have jobs available.' Inner-city educational opportunities are likely to be substandard, further decreasing the possibility
for lucrative job opportunities.
Economic, racial and ethnic segregation are perpetuated by the
prevalent local governmental policy of exclusionary zoning."
United States localities generally have plenary authority over land
use restrictions, subject only to Fourteenth Amendment limitations, and any limitations imposed by the state constitution or
zoning enabling act.7 Thus, municipalities can restrict multifamily
development, create minimum lot and room sizes, establish a maximum number of bedrooms,8 or require setbacks-and these are
only some of the tools in the zoning arsenal. These strategies increase the overall cost of purchasing (or renting) a home, and
therefore effectively exclude the poor from the municipal boundaries. This results in a United States composed of two separate, noninteracting societies: minority areas with inferior schools, few jobs,
and high crime; and safe white suburbs with expensive houses and
high-quality public schools. l
A number of states have accepted the mission of opening up the
suburbs. Existing solutions have generally fallen into one of three
categories. First, state judiciaries began interpreting their constitutions and zoning enabling acts to place limits on municipalities'

3.

See Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & David L. Sjoquist, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis, 9 Hous-

ING POLICY DEBATE

849 (1998).

4.
See id. at 878.
5.
See id. at 879.
6.
See Paul K. Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt
at Openingthe Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REv. 535, 539-42 (1992).
7.
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). But see David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2255 (2003) (arguing that localities' control
over land use is not as extensive as is generally believed).
8.
More bedrooms mean more children and, therefore, more strain on the local
school system.
9.
See CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE 8 (1996).
10.
See id. at 5.
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zoning power." Second, a number of states passed appeals statutes,
which allowed affordable housing developers to appeal local denials of building permits to a state administrative agency. 2 Finally,
other states explored mechanisms by which localities were required
to produce a general plan to which their zoning ordinances would
comport; this general plan would be subject to review by the state
to ensure that it provided sufficient opportunity for the construction of affordable housing. 3 Thus far, none of these solutions
has
4
been successful in solving the affordable housing crisis.1
The root cause of the failure of existing affordable housing regimes, this Note suggests, is the lack of democratic accountability
of the bodies charged with administering the programs. Simply
put, cities and towns, and their residents, resent having affordable
housing forced upon them without their consent. Rather than allowing the localities in a region to bargain for an optimal
distribution of affordable housing, a solution is imposed by a state
administrative agency or by a judge. In the end, no one benefits:
municipalities resistant to affordable housing feel harassed by the
state or the judiciary, and the housing may be postponed or cancelled as municipalities mount vigorous legal challenges and
public relations campaigns against the housing.
The alternative set forth in this Note permits localities to set
their own affordable housing destiny in a collaborative decisionmaking context. This Note proposes a Regional Housing Legislature (RHL), a limited regional government devoted to setting
housing policy for a region. This Note draws from some of Professor Gerald Frug's ideas for a regional legislature patterned after
the government of the European Union. 5 This proposal differs, in
part, in that the RHL is not a general government; it is constrained
in ways analogous to administrative agencies. 6 Nonetheless, the
core characterization of the body as a legislature, and not an administrative body, is crucial, as it confers on the RHL the
democratic legitimacy it is intended to have. 7 The RHL would be
composed of representatives from each town in the region. Votes
11.
See infra Part I.A.
12.
See infra Part I.B.
13.
See infra Part I.C.
14.
See infra Parts I.A-D
15.
See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1798-99
(2002); see also infra p. 53.
16.
Like administrative agencies, the RHL's jurisdiction would be circumscribed to a
particular subject matter.
17.
Moreover, as a representative legislature, it is anticipated that state court judges
will grant a great degree of deference to the RHL's rulings.
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(and possibly representatives) would be apportioned on a oneperson, one-vote basis.
Although the RHL is conceived as a legislature, it would function as a land use court of last resort as well.' As a legislature, the
RHL would set housing policy for the region, focusing on meeting
the regional need for affordable housing, and alleviating the impact or existence of economic and racial segregation. As a court, it
would review challenges to municipalities' local housing policies
for conformity with the policies set forth by the RHL.
This Note contends that the body established under this proposal would arrive at effective substantive rules for the creation of
affordable housing. More importantly, the participatory nature of
the process by which the rules are enacted would lead to a greater
degree of acceptance of the rules themselves. At the same time, by
adhering to the one-person, one-vote maxim, the populous inner
cities could ensure that the end goal of more affordable housing
always remains in sight.
Part I of this Note examines the three current models by which
states currently address the problem of segregation and lack of affordable housing. It concludes that each of these models suffers
from fundamental flaws that fatally impair their efficacy and/or
democratic legitimacy. Part II extrapolates from these models some
positive elements that may be adopted in a more structurally promising housing solution. Part III proposes a Regional Housing
Legislature, describes its procedures, and argues that such an entity would solve many of the problems inherent in current
approaches. Part IV concludes by examining broader implications
of democratic regional affordable housing policy-making.
I.

FAILURE OF EXISTING MODELS

State judiciaries were the first governmental entities to address
exclusionary zoning. With the exception of New Jersey's, most state
courts adopted conservative, deferential analyses, rarely overturning local zoning decisions. However, in the wake of New Jersey's
Mt. Laurel decisions, 19 some state legislatures entered the fray, en18.
In this, the RHL again resembles an administrative agency, in the sense that it violates strict separation of powers. See infra note 306.
19.
S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975) [hereinafter Mt. Laurel 1]; S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mt. Laurel 11]. See also Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of
Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
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acting statutes designed to modify or supplant the common-law
approach. These statutes, still in effect, generally take one of two
forms. The first is the appeals statute permitting courts or state
administrative agencies to review local government zoning action
based on statutorily specified criteria. The second is the centralized
planning approach, in which a state administrative agency affirmatively sets forth housing goals for municipalities, and approves or
rejects the local comprehensive plans to which local zoning ordinances are required to conform.
None of these approaches successfully balances efficiency, local
autonomy, and democratic legitimacy. Some, while respectful of
local autonomy, are simply ineffective. ° Others, while at least partially effective, are normative failures because they do not
adequately address the issue of local autonomy.2' Finally, these
models each provide for judicial or technocratic oversight; none
provides for democratic control of the affordable housing process.
A. Common-Law JudicialReview Model

1. Overview--In the absence of specific guidance from the state
legislature, state courts confronting exclusionary zoning ordinances rely on the state constitution or on the state zoning
enabling act. But these sources of law provide little guidance to all
but the most activist of courts. The vague mandates of the state
constitution or zoning enabling act are generally insufficient to
offset the high degree of deference state courts grant to localities
exercising their "legislative" zoning functions. Moreover, seeking
judicial review is an inaccessible process for a low-income plaintiff,
requiring access to adequate counsel and time. The odds against
the plaintiff are even worse given that the defendant municipality
has better access to legal advice and representation.
At least eight states have established a common-law tradition
under which the state constitution or zoning enabling act are interpreted to place limits on municipalities who wish to engage in
20.
See, e.g., infra Parts II.B.1, III.C.
21.
For instance, Montgomery County, Maryland, described infra Part I.D., has by all
accounts an extremely effective affordable housing regime. It also has no local governments.
Despite its surface appeal, such an approach cannot be the basis of a normative vision. A
generalization of this model would lead to the sacrifice of the American ideal of an active
citizenry, substituting a paternalistic, undemocratic central state government. Once again,
there can be no dispute that such a system would be effective, but it would be only at enormous cost.
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exclusionary zoning. These states fall along a continuum ofjudicial
activism. Courts in Michigan, Virginia and Illinois are extremely
deferential to local zoning ordinances, overturning them only on a
high showing of unreasonableness.22 New York, Pennsylvania, and
California occupy a middle ground. 3 The New Hampshire Supreme Court has been quite critical of exclusionary zoning, but its
24
enforcement ability is limited. Finally, New Jersey courts have
been the most critical of local exclusionary tactics.2 ' It is instructive
to compare Michigan, the least effective model, with middle-of-theroad New York, with activist New Jersey in order to fully appreciate
the shortcomings of the common lawjudicial review model.
2. Reasonableness Analysis: Michigan-Michigan'sstate constitu-

tion requires that the exercise of the police power have a
reasonable basis. 6 The Michigan Supreme Court has, on at least
one occasion, used this provision to strike down a city ordinance
banning mobile homes except in mobile home parks.2 v However, a
plaintiff faces an uphill battle in arguing that a zoning ordinance is
unreasonable. Under Michigan law, an ordinance is unreasonable
only when it deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right, such as
due process, equal protection, or just compensation for the depri-

22.
See Robinson Township v. Knoll, 302 N.W.2d 146, 150 (Mich. 1980); Bd. of County
Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (Va. 1959); Lakeland Bluff v.
County of Will, 252 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ill. App. 1969) ("The presumption of validity which
arises from enactment of a zoning ordinance can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the ordinance, as applied to the subject land, was arbitrary and unreasonable and
without real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals and welfare.").
See Berenson v. Town of New Castle 341 N.E.2d 236, 242 (N.Y. 1975) (creating a
23.
two-part test: "whether the [zoning] board has provided a properly balanced and well ordered plan for the community," and whether the board gave "consideration ... to regional
needs and requirements"); Surrick v. Township of Upper Providence, 382 A.2d 105, 110-11
(Pa. 1977) (also adopting a two-part test, first considering "whether the community in question is a logical area for development and population growth," and second, determining the
extent of any exclusionary result or purpose); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d
565, 569 (Cal. 1980) (holding that zoning is a legislative, not administrative or adjudicative,
act); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 178 Cal. Rptr. 723, 727-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(on remand, nonetheless overturning the exclusionary ordinance on the grounds that it
took only the local, not the regional, welfare into account). California's judicial review approach has been supplemented by a statutory regime, discussed infra Part II.B.1.
See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 495 (N.H. 1991) (holding that the
24.
state's zoning enabling act required municipalities to zone for their fair share of affordable
housing). However, no subsequent decision has come down in New Hampshire applying this
decision.
See infra Part I.A.4.
25.
See Robinson Township, 302 N.W.2d at 149.
26.
27.
See id.
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vation of property. The plaintiff retains a rather high burden of
making such a showing. '
In utilizing a "reasonableness" standard, Michigan courts have
opted to rely on malleable, but deferential standards rather than
more definitive rules. Not only does this approach leave much to
the individual judge's discretion, but the judiciary's natural desire
to avoid substituting its will for that of the legislature 30 renders
judges reluctant to overturn zoning ordinances.
Generally, reasonableness analysis is insufficient to ameliorate
the effects of exclusionary zoning. 3' Three fundamental defects
inhere in this approach. First, the analysis is rendered nugatory if
courts do not articulate the viewpoint from which reasonableness is
to be judged. For example, if reasonableness is judged from the
vantage of current local inhabitants, then almost any exclusionary
measure will be perceived to be reasonable, since it will often be in
the best economic interests of the residents of a well-to-do suburb
to exclude the poor.
Second, even if reasonableness is judged from the vantage of the
region as a whole, without a clear definition of housing need, judicial reasonableness analysis will be ineffective. As an example,
suppose an inner city has more than enough affordable housing
for area residents. Exurbs32 might argue that no housing need exists, because all of the area's residents can be affordably housed in
the region. This argument overlooks the importance of to lowincome residents of moving out of areas of concentrated poverty. It
also fails to consider the hardship imposed on a central city's treasury when a significant percentage of its residents are low-income,
which starts a vicious cycle in which the city is unable to provide
basic services, causing flight on the part of any resident who is able
to exit.
It is clear, then, that the precise definition of "need" may be the
single deciding factor in any attempt to deconcentrate poverty. Yet
courts, given their case-by-case vantage point and minimal investigatory resources, are ill-suited to formulate such a precise
28.
See Kropfv. City of Sterling Heights, 215 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Mich. 1974).
29.
Id.
30.
See, e.g., id. at 188 ("It is not for this Court to second guess the local governing bodies in the absence of a showing that that body was arbitrary or capricious in its exclusion of
other uses from a single-family residential district.").
31.
Cf Ben Field, Why Our FairShare HousingLaws Fai, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 35, 6168 (1993) (arguing that courts cannot effectively enforce a fair share standard).
32.
I use the term "exurbs" throughout to designate suburbs beyond the inner ring.
Inner-ring suburbs, by contrast, are often unable to exclude the poor. MYRON ORFIELD,
AMERICAN METROPOLITIcs: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 164 (2002).
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definition. Indeed, arriving at a definition of housing need seems a
quintessential legislative function.
Finally, it is impossible to achieve significant reversal of exclusionary practices under a regime that requires location-by-location
challenges. One developer's success means simply that that developer may create housing on a given site. The victory may not make
it appreciably easier for the next affordable housing developer,
who wishes to build on a separate site, which may raise a host of
separate objections, such as availability of city infrastructure, traffic
effects, health and safety design details. What is needed, instead, is
a strict liability mechanism by which localities, at least by default,
are required to provide for their fair share of regional housing
need.
3. Judicial Deference: New York-New York courts have, at least

rhetorically, been willing to move beyond a reasonableness approach in interpreting its state constitution to require localities to
permit the building of affordable housing. However, the New York
approach is still characterized by a great degree of judicial deference to local decision-making authority. 3 In Berenson v. Town of New
Castle,34 the New York Court of Appeals held that site-specific relief

may be available3 5 where a two-part test is satisfied: "whether the
[zoning] board has provided a properly balanced and well ordered
plan for the community,"36 and whether the board gave "consideration ... to regional needs and requirements. ' The Court
cautioned, however, that "[z]oning ... is essentially a legislative
act, " s and noted that "[z]oning ordinances are susceptible to con-

stitutional challenge only if 'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare. ' '' " Thus, the opinion makes it clear that the
Court would be unwilling to act as a super-zoning board. The stan-

Subsequent to the cases described in this Part, New York enacted legislation in33.
tended to address some of the issues described. See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b (Consol. 2003);
N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-703 (Consol. 2003); N.Y. GENERAL CITY LAw § 81-d (Consol. 2003);
see a/soJulie M. Solinski, Affordable Housing Law In New York, New Jersey, And Connecticut: Lessons For OtherStates, 8J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 36, 63-64 (Fall, 1998).
However, the statute does not impose any requirements on municipalities; instead, it merely
empowers them to zone for affordable housing, and has generally been ineffective.
34.
341 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y 1975).
35.
I.e., that a court may order a locality to permit a development to go forward, despite an adverse decision by the locality's zoning board.
36.
Berenson, 341 N.E.2d at 242.
37.
Id.
Id. at 243.
38.
Id. at 240 (quoting Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 at 395).
39.
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dard for holding a zoning enactment unconstitutional would be
high, and the relief granted narrow.
On remand from the Berenson decision, the trial court found
that the town of New Castle failed both prongs of the Court of Appeals' test, and ordered the town to rezone the land, and moreover
to amend its zoning laws so as to permit the construction of at least
3,500 units of multi-family housing over the subsequent ten years.4"
On appeal, the Appellate Division upheld the rezoning order, but
deleted the "fair share quota" provision requiring 3,500 new
units.4' In doing so, the court rejected a strict fair share requirement, holding that if, for instance, neighboring communities
provided enough low- and moderate-income housing, New Castle
would not also be required to do so.42 Convinced that there was, in
fact, an unmet need for low- and moderate-income housing, but
unwilling to amend the zoning code by judicial fiat, the Appellate
Division remanded the case to the Town Board
to amend its ordi43
nance and remedy the unconstitutionality.
The Berenson line of cases has not been effective at promoting affordable housing.44 The New York courts demand a high
evidentiary showing. The plaintiff must first prove that the zoning
ordinance is exclusionary. She must then present evidence to establish the precise regional need for affordable housing, how
much of that need is unmet, and how much affordable housing the
town's infrastructure can realistically support.40 Even then, a New
York court will not order specific numerical quotas. 6 Under the
New York judicial view, zoning itself is a tool that is only of limited
effectiveness in creating affordable housing in the absence of government subsidies; 47 thus judicial intervention in zoning issues may
be ineffective and therefore unwarranted. 6
Overall, the affordable housing situation in New York is one in
which the judiciary continues to act with excessive restraint, calling
40.
See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 415 N.YS.2d 669, 667 (N.Y.A.D. 1979) [hereinafter Berenson I/].
41.
See id. at 680.
42.
See id. at 679.
43.
Id.
44.
See Solinski, supranote 33, at 40.
45.
See Berenson I, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 677-78.
46.
See id. at 678 ("[Slpecific, mandatory 'fair share' quota[s are] unsupported by case
law and contrary to the public policy considerations embodied therein.").
47.
See Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (N.Y.A.D. 1983); Kenneth
Forton, Note, Expanding the Effectiveness of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Law by Eliminating its Subsidy Requirement, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 651, 679 (2001).
48.
Cf Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 442-50 (requiring municipalities to act affirmatively to
create affordable housing if modifying their zoning ordinances proved insufficient).
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instead on local legislatures to fix the problems. Given the lack of
enforcement authority provided for in Berenson II, the Town Boards
have little incentive to modify their zoning, even when it is directly
challenged and held unconstitutional. The New York approach is
thus paradigmatic of the limitations ofjudicial solutions in addressing affordable housing.
4. Activist Approach: New Jersey-The situation in New Jersey is

quite different. In the face of a vague constitutional standard, the
New Jersey Supreme Court, in a series of cases arising out of Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P

v. Township of Mount Laurel,

adopted a "fair share" doctrine requiring developing suburban localities to zone so as to accommodate their fair share of affordable
housing." A vast literature has been devoted to analyzing the Mt.
Laurel cases; 50 what follows is a brief summary.
Under the NewJersey constitution, the state Supreme Court has
held that municipalities must not only affirmatively zone to meet
their fair share of regional affordable housing needs, but must also
actively encourage the building of affordable housing."' In Mt. Laurel I, low-income residents of the township of Mt. Laurel, New
Jersey, sued the township. The residents attacked the entirety of its
zoning• code,
alleging it to be exclusionary and therefore unconsti52
tutional. The trial court upheld the challenge and invalidated the
entire zoning code. 9 On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that each municipality must meet its fair share of regional
housing needs-even if it made more sense to locate such housing
in the neighboring town. 54 With respect to a remedy, the Court vacated the invalidation of the zoning ordinance and expressed faith
that Mt. Laurel would
amend its zoning ordinance to conform to
55
the Court's opinion.

Such faith proved premature. Eight years later, the N.A.A.C.P.
brought suit against the township for failure to remedy its exclu49.
50.

See Mt. Laurel 1,336 A.2d at 731-32.
See, e.g., Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning

Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 627-30 (1987) (hereinafter McDougall, Litigation);
DAVID L. KIRP, JOHN P. DWYER, AND LARRY A. ROSENTHAL, OUR TOWN (1995); Naomi Bailin
Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268
(1997), Harold A. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation For Exclusionary
Zoning, 60 Temp. L.Q. 665 (1987) (hereinafter McDougall, RCA); HAAR, Supra note 9.
51.
See Mt. Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 724; Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 442-47; see also Note,
State-SponsoredGrowth Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1127,
1130 (1995).
52.
Mt. Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 716.
53.
Id.
54.
See id. at 732-33.
55.
Id. at 734.
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sionary policies. In the resulting decision, Mt. Laurel II, the New
Jersey Supreme Court set forth definitive rules governing municipalities' obligations to provide for their fair share of affordable
housing.5" It established a judicial monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance, including three designated judges to hear all
cases arising under Mt. Laurel I.57 Moreover, the Court ordered
that any developing municipality (that is, any municipality in a
growth area designated by the state) not only remove barriers to
affordable housing but actually act affirmatively to ensure a realistic possibility that affordable housing would be built. Such
affirmative action might include requiring the use of state or federal subsidies in new housing (subsidies which themselves require
that the units being built are affordable), or requiring developers
to set aside a certain portion of their developments for low-income
housing. 581
The Court went even further by providing for a "builder's remedy." This would enable a judge to authorize construction of a
high-density development even where that development was not
permitted by the zoning ordinance, if at least twenty percent of the
proposed development would be affordable, and if the locality was
in violation of its obligation to provide for its fair share of housing.59 Under this scheme, developers become proxies for the poor;
they fight for the creation of low-income housing in return for a
"density bonus," i.e., the right to develop more housing on less
land, thereby increasing their profit margins. 60
Because of New Jersey's elaborate judicial enforcement mechanism, detailed evidentiary requirements, and effective imposition
of strict liability if a municipality does not meet its fair share requirements,' the Mt. Laurel II approach more closely resembles a
rules-based administrative regime rather than standards-based judicial adjudication. Indeed, Mt. Laurel // was superceded by a
statute creating an administrative regime. The Mt. Laurel approach
addresses many of the concerns raised in the two preceding subsections. In particular, the imposition of rules, instead of standards,
forces a locality to heed its duty to create affordable housing.
Moreover, judicial deference to local legislative will is not a concern under the Mt. Laurel line of cases. Nonetheless, other
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 418-21.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 452.
See Forton, supra note 47, at 679 (discussing the density bonus).
See Mt. Laurel I, 456 A.2d at 418-19.
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difficulties, common to all the judicial review models, are present
in NewJersey. These concerns are expanded in the next section.
5. Analysis-Two fundamental difficulties are endemic to the
common-law judicial review approach. First, it is difficult to effect
sweeping change in a recalcitrant municipality under a case-by-case
approach. Second, the judicial review model is fundamentally undemocratic, forcing judges to be proxies for a constituency that,
were the region properly organized politically, should be able to
speak for itself.
a. Effectiveness-The lack of effectiveness of judicially-created
remedies for affordable housing may be traced to two causes. First,
with the notable exception of the Mt. Laurel decisions, states that
must rely on common-law adjudication are relegated to imprecise
standards susceptible to interpretation and abuse by localities,
rather than precise rules leaving no doubt as to the municipalities'
obligations. Second, even where there are rules, reliance on private
enforcement diminishes effectiveness by reducing the certainty of
challenge.
Malleable standards severely reduce the effectiveness of an affordable housing proposal by failing to provide sufficient guidance
to municipalities. This proposition is borne out by the necessity of
Mt. Laurel II in the wake of local unwillingness to follow the dictates of Mt. Laurel L So long as municipal officials are elected by
the inhabitants of the municipality, rather than by residents of the
region, there will be a strong incentive for them to act with only
the municipality's narrow interest in mind. 62 Unchecked standards
applied by a court (e.g., reasonableness) provide little certainty
and are therefore unlikely to affect municipalities' actions ex ante.
Moreover, solely ex-post application of standards in the courtroom
cannot effect widescale change in the exclusionary practices of
municipalities due to limitations on judicial resources, the amount
of time the judicial process requires, and the limitations on the
future effect of any decision given the highly fact-specific nature of
land use litigation.
Judicially mandated rules, while more certain, are inappropriate
for a common-law judicial review regime. The Berenson line of cases
in New York exemplifies the discomfort judges have with such
rules. Judges see rulemaking as a legislative or administrative function and are unwilling to engage in it. They are willing to pass on
the reasonableness of any given ordinance, but less able to set forth
62.
Cf Jerry Frug, DecenteringDecentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 329-34 (1993)
(describing a mechanism by which individuals outside a municipality may be given a voice in
municipal elections).
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definitive criteria, capable of mechanistic application, that will
yield the correct answer. The NewJersey court is the exception that
proves the rule. The Mt. LaurelII court effectively set up an administrative agency in judicial disguise. The "agency" employed three
administrators (i.e., the Mt. Laurel judges) and the court established an administrative code to apply (i.e., the detailed remedies
set forth in the opinion). This regime persisted until supplanted by
a properly legislative solution, discussed infra Part I.C.
Furthermore, relying on private enforcement dilutes much of
the deterrence value of any scheme designed to encourage the
creation of affordable housing; the entities who have standing to
sue will not always have interests aligned with those of the region.
Ideally, the beneficiaries of the program (i.e., the poor inner city
residents who would like to move to the suburbs) should be the
program's primary enforcers. With the possible exception of class
action suits, it is unlikely that such individuals have the resources to
challenge an exclusionary zoning ordinance. Moreover, the judicial doctrine of standing would need to be stretched in order to
provide such individuals with the right to sue over facially exclusionary statutes. In particular, the injury that poor inner-city
residents suffer as a result of the exclusionary ordinance may be
indirect and therefore may not be susceptible to judicial enforcement, at least under federal concepts of standing.63
Developers would clearly have standing to challenge the ordinances. However, developers make poor proxies for disadvantaged
residents of the inner city. First, the cost of litigation must figure
prominently in developers' calculus. In a world of high attorney's
fees and weak standards (resulting in uncertainty as to litigation
outcome), it is relatively rare that a low-income development in the
suburbs would provide a sufficient return to warrant challenging a
zoning ordinance. Second, even where a developer does commence litigation, it is not improbable that a town would propose a
settlement by which the town relaxes its zoning requirements in
exchange for the developer creating luxury units instead of lowincome units. Either way, the voice of the beneficiaries of this program is stifled, and the program goes unenforced.
63.
In federal courts, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). In the exclusionary zoning scenario, it is the developer who is directly harmed (by not being permitted to build). If a state court adopts
federal standards of standing, potential residents may not be permitted to sue if the court
determines that resolution of the dispute will not provide them with housing, since a developer still needs to create the housing.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 37:2

b. Democratic Concerns-Two questions are of interest here. First,
to what extent does the common-law judicial enforcement model
empower or disempower the residents of a local community? Second, to what extent does the model affect the empowerment of the
regional residents?
Even to state the first question implies its answer. Clearly, judicial
intervention into a decision made entirely by the elected representatives of a locality cannot empower the locality's residents. Quite
the opposite; an unelected judge 64 interfering in local legislative
actions seems the antithesis of democracy.
The question is more complex when the relevant populationthe demo-is redefined to include the residents of the metropolitan
area. The fundamental problem, after all, is that, by enacting exclusionary zoning ordinances, localities are imposing externalities
on other localities, which may be undesirable in the view of a majority of the region's inhabitants. Still, democracy is a process, not a
result. If the majority of a region's inhabitants are oppressed by a
minority's actions, then the forum for airing their grievances
should be in the legislature, not in the courts. Yet there is no such
legislature, elected by and representing the residents of the metropolitan region, in most areas. What is needed is a forum in which
the relevant demos, the regional residents upon whom local zoning
decisions have their impact, may be heard.
Thus, the common-law judicial review model is unlikely to be effective, given the great deference granted to local legislative acts,
and the vague standards courts must set forth. Even where, as in
New Jersey, these difficulties are circumvented, private enforcement in the courts is unlikely to prove efficient. Finally,
normatively speaking, if affordable housing is in some form supported by the majority of a region's population, it should be
created through a democratic process and not by the undemocratic forces of the court. Therefore, one must look to other
models for guidance.

B. Appeals Statute Model

Appeals statutes adjust the pro-municipality balance inherent in
the common-law judicial review model. In particular, they lower
the cost of litigation by placing it in front of an administrative
64.
Some states elect their judges. However, the point remains that in no state is a
judge supposed to act as a democratic representative.
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agency. They also increase certainty by providing administrativelydefined rules. Developers often find it easier to override local zoning ordinances in order to build affordable housing, as the appeals
statutes often adjust the evidentiary standards needed to show that
a municipality is acting in an exclusionary manner.
However, community opposition to such systems, which are perceived as incursions into the locality's home rule right to develop
its own zoning scheme, diminish the scheme's effectiveness. Community opposition takes the form of litigation (increasing
developers' building costs), as well as more informal hostility (reducing the chance that inner-city poor minorities will want to live
in the neighborhood). Moreover, the scheme is paternalistic from
the perspective of both the community residents and the intended
beneficiaries. Appeals statutes operate on the assumption that dispersed affordable housing is uniformly in the interests of the innercity poor, without giving them an opportunity to participate in this
determination.
Massachusetts, 66 Rhode Island, 67 and Connecticute s each have
appeals statutes. Rhode Island and Connecticut derived their statutes from Massachusetts'. A brief description of Massachusetts'
appeals statute, therefore, assists in understanding the overall approach.
1. Massachusetts' Statute-In 1969, the Massachusetts General

Court enacted the Low and Moderate Income Housing

Act, 69

oth-

65.
For example, a given inner-city African American community may feel strongly that
its political power will be unacceptably diminished if its members are given incentives to
move to the suburbs. Or a community may simply feel that a given suburb is racist, or far
from available jobs, or otherwise unsuitable for habitation by its members, and that therefore resources should not be wasted building housing there. Inner-city community members
may "vote with their feet" by refusing to move to inappropriate, newly built affordable housing-but their places will likely be taken by moderate-income local community members
such as town employees. Developers, of course, do not care who moves into the newly-built
housing; but from a policy perspective, those most in need of dispersed housing should be
provided for first. This can only be accomplished by granting these communities political
influence over the mechanism by which affordable housing is created, which cannot be
accomplished in a traditional appeals statute regime.
66.
See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2000).
67.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-53-1 to 45-53-8 (1999 & Supp. 2003).
68.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2003).
69.
Act of Aug. 23, 1969, ch. 774, 1969 Mass. Acts 712 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (2000)). See Stockman, supra note 6; JAMES BREAGY, CITIZENS HOUSING
AND PLANNING ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN BOSTON, OVERRIDING THE SUBURBS (1976);

Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and
Zoning Appeals Act, 22 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 381 (2001); Forton, supranote 47; Note, The Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Law, 54 B.U. L. REV. 37 (1974).
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erwise known as the Anti-Snob Zoning Act," to address problems
of urban decay exacerbated by rampant exclusionary zoning in
Massachusetts. 71 The passage of the bill was seen as a political fluke,
the result of an unlikely alliance between liberals and urban conservatives, the latter of whom were seeking political retribution for
earlier legislation enacted primarily by suburban liberals. Thus,
the legislation is at the same time vague, due to its compromise
nature, and sweeping, due to its support by urban backers. In its
thirty year history, it has lent itself to both broad and narrow interpretations.
The Act aims to encourage the creation of "low and moderate
income" 73 housing, which it defines as housing built with a federal
or state subsidy.7 The only entities eligible to create low-income
housing are public agencies, limited dividend developers, and
nonprofit agencies. 75 The Act eases the construction of affordable

housing in two ways. First, on the local level, it simplifies the permit
process, which often requires a developer to appear before multiple local boards for various permits. The Act provides that any
eligible developer who wishes to build low or moderate income
housing need only present a single, comprehensive permit application to the local zoning board of appeals. The board must hold a
public hearing within thirty days and consult with the other relevant local boards. It then has the power to issue a comprehensive
permit, attaching conditions if appropriate. The issuance of a comprehensive permit is subject to immediate judicial review. 6
70.
71.
72.

See Krefetz, supra note 69, at 381 n.3 and accompanying text.
See Stockman, supra note 6, at 547-48.
See id. at 548-50
73.
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 40B § 20 (2000).
74.
Stockman, supra note 6, at 548-50. See also Forton, supra note 47, at 679 (critiquing
the subsidy requirement).
75.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B § 21 (2000). The term "limited dividend developer" is
interpreted broadly as:
[A] ny applicant which proposes to sponsor housing under M.G.L. c. 40B; and is not a
public agency; and is eligible to receive a subsidy from a state or federal agency after
a comprehensive permit has been issued and which, unless otherwise governed by a
federal act or regulation, agrees to limit the dividend on the invested equity to no
more than that allowed by the applicable statute or regulations governing the pertinent housing program.
760 MASS. REGS. tit. 760 § 30.02 (2002). Thus, any private developer could qualify as a limited dividend developer for a given project. Indeed, between 1970 and 1999, 60% of the
units created under the statute were built by limited dividend developers. DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,

CHAPTER

40B:

WHAT DO THE NUMBERS

SHOW?,

at http://www.state.ma.us/dhcd/Ch40B/Data.htm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter CHAPTER 40B].
76.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B § 21 (2000).
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The second provision of the Act addresses the situation where a
local board denies the permit, or attaches conditions that render it
"uneconomic" for the developer.7 In this instance, the developer
has the right to appeal to a Housing Appeals Committee (HAC), a
unit of the state Department of Housing and Community Development. The statute provides that the Housing Appeals Committee
will review the findings of the local board, and then arrive at its
own decision by majority vote. 8 In arriving at its decision, the
Housing Appeals Committee reviews the zoning board decision for
reasonableness and consistency with local needs.79 Ordinances are
consistent with local needs:
[I]f they are reasonable in view of the regional need for low
and moderate income housing considered with the number
of low income persons in the city or town affected and the
need to protect the health or safety of the occupants of the
proposed housing or of the residents of the city or town, to
promote better site and building design in relation to the surroundings, or to preserve open spaces, and if such
requirements and regulations are applied as equally as possible to both subsidized and unsubsidized housing.8 °
This standards-based approach is clarified by a number of administrative rules.8'
One rule of import, provided by the statute itself, is the safe
harbor provision for municipalities that meet the goal of 10% affordable housing. The Massachusetts Act immunizes municipalities
that meet their 10% goal by providing that zoning ordinances enacted by such municipalities are, by definition, consistent with local
needs. 8 The superiority of this simple rules-based approach is evident when compared with the judicial approach, with its
uncertainty about what constitutes a "reasonable" zoning ordinance. The perhaps overly-simplistic 10% heuristic also differs
77.
See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 40B § 22 (2000).
78.
Id. In 1973, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court confirmed the constitutionality of the Act. Bd. of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d 393, 407-10 (Mass.
1973).
79.
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 40B § 23 (2002).
80.
MAss. GEN. LAwS ch. 40B § 20 (2002).
81.
See MASS. REGS. CODE fit. 760, ch. 31 (2002).
82.
See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 40B § 20 (2002). Also exempted are municipalities for
whom 1.5% of the total land area zoned for residential use is filled with affordable housing.
Ordinances precluding developments that would cover more than the greater of .3% of the
land area of a municipality, or ten acres, are also "consistent with local needs." Id.
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sharply from the New Jersey approach, wherein an administrative
agency is charged with ascertaining each town's fair share of housing after conducting surveys of existing housing stock and
projected population growth. 8'
Early effectiveness of the Act was limited.84 In response, in 1982,
Governor Edward J. King promulgated Executive Order 215, withholding state and federal funds from communities deemed to be
engaging in exclusionary zoning. In addition, the state legislature
and the Department of Housing and Community Development
created incentive programs designed to encourage the creation of
more politically and economically palatable mixed-income housing. The first such program, State Housing Assistance for Rental
Production (SHARP), 8" was established in 1983 to provide lowinterest loans to developers who agree to permanently reserve one
quarter of the units developed for low-income tenants. 87 Second,
under the Tax-Exempt Loans to Encourage Rental Housing
(TELLER) program,88 local housing authorities may issue tax-free
bonds to finance developments in which either 20% of the units
are rented to households with incomes less than half the area median; or alternatively, 40% of the units are rented to households
with incomes less than 60% of the area median. Restrictions under
TELLER are eliminated after fifteen years.89
Finally, under the Homeownership Opportunity Program
(HOP), 90 established in 1986, 30% of units must be set aside for
low- or moderate-income purchasers. The units are subject to strict
resale controls, which must remain in place for at least 40 years, to
ensure that the units remain affordable. The program provides
low-interest loans and guarantees to developers, low down payment
mortgages to potential homeowners, and grants to localities. 9' Both
affordable units and market rate units in eligible developments
count toward the municipality's 10% goal. 2

See infra Part I.C.1.; see also Sam Stonefield, Affordable Housing in Suburbia: the Impor83.
tance but Limited Power and Effectiveness of the State Override Tool, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 323,
340 (2001).
84.
Stockman, supra note 6, at 554.
85.
Id.
86.
Codized in MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 23B, §§ 25-27 (2000).
87.
Stockman, supra note 6, at 556.
88.
See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, ch. 21 (2002).
89.
Stockman, supra note 6, at 556.
MASS. REC.S. CODE tit. 760, ch. 20 (2002).
90.
Stockman, supra note 6, at 555.
91.
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 20.05 (2002).
92.
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HOP, in particular, proved quite successful, and provoked an intense backlash on the part of many Massachusetts municipalities.
A year after the creation of HOP, 24 bills attacking the Act were
introduced into the state legislature 4 In response, in 1989, the
Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD)
created a new program under the Act: the Local Initiative Program
(LIP) .9 The new program was a response to widespread criticism
that the subsidy requirement undercounted a town's affordable
housing stock by not including developments unsubsidized by the
state or local government. As a result, LIP greatly expanded the
definition of affordable housing. The newly-enacted regulations
provided that technical assistance provided by the DHCD would
count as the subsidy required under the Act. 96 LIP also provided
for use requirements that, for rental units, limited monthly rent to
30% of the income of a household earning 80% of the area's median income."' For units for sale, the price must be such that, for a
30-year mortgage with a 5% down payment, monthly mortgage
payments do not exceed 30% of the income of a household earning 80% of the area's median income. 8 All rental units in a
development are counted as affordable if 25% of them are affordable." The LIP program also requires affirmative marketing to
minorities, with the goal of achieving a minority occupancy rate
equal to the percentage of income-eligible minority households in
the region."°
LIP afforded local communities greater control over the affordable housing produced in their borders in two ways. First, a project
cannot be a LIP project unless it is so designated by the town's
0
chief elected official."
Thus, a developer who wishes to create lowincome housing against the wishes of the town still needs to seek a
state or federal subsidy to invoke the appeals process. Developers
are thereby encouraged to work with, instead of against, towns.
93.
Krefetz, supranote 69, at 406-07.
94.
Id. at 407-08.
95.
See MASS. REGS. CODE tit.
760, ch. 45 (2002).
96.
See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760 ch. 45.03 (2002) ("[The Department shall thereafter count the units [created under the LIP program] on The Subsidized Housing
Inventory ....
").
97.
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 45.03(5) (2002).
98.
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 45.03(4) (2002).
99.
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 45.07(3) (2002).
100.

DEPARTMENT

OF HOUSING

AND

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,

LOCAL

INITIATIVE

4 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.state.ma.
us/dhcd/components/private/LIPApp.doc (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter LIP APPLICATION].
101.
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, §§ 45.03-45.05 (2002).
PROGRAM:

UNITS

ONLY

APPLICATION
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Second, localities are entitled to grant a preference for
local resi2
dents in up to 70% of the units in a given LIP project.
2. Analysis-The statutory appeals process may be evaluated
based on three criteria: its effectiveness, community support, and
its democratic legitimacy.
a. Effectiveness-There is a wealth of data regarding the affordable housing built in response to the statutes in Massachusetts.
According to the Massachusetts Department of Housing and
Community Development, the appeals process has led to the creation of 25,000 units in 172 cities and towns. 0 3 The Department
credits the creation of at least some of the 94,379 additional units
created between 1970 and 1999 with the background effect of the
statute, even if the comprehensive permit process was not directly
used. 0 4 In addition, the Department notes that 53% of the decisions of the local zoning boards of appeals were the products of
compromise between the town and the developer-that is, the
board granted the permit subject to conditions.'0 5
Scholarly analysis supports Massachusetts' claims that its statute
has been at least modestly successful.'0 6 One study found that,
whereas roughly half of Massachusetts municipalities had no affordable housing when the statute went into effect, by 1997 only
15% had no such housing. 7 By October of 2001, that number had
l The comprehensive perdropped to 43 municipalities, or 12%. 08
mit process was used directly in over 60% of the towns that had no
affordable housing in 1969 but do now. It is reasonable to conclude that the process helped spur at least some of the
construction in the remaining 40% of the towns by making them

102. LIP APPLICATION, supra note 100, at 5. Many localities are interested in affordable
housing to the extent it will allow their teachers and town employees to remain in the town.
See Krefetz, supra note 69, at 412; see also MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 112 (1976) (explaining that a primary motivation for the creation of inclusionary
zoning ordinances in Montgomery County, Maryland and Fairfax County, Virginia was to
create housing for county employees).
103. CHAPTER 40B, supranote 75.
104. See id. (noting that between 1970 and 1999, the affordable housing inventory rose
from 85,621 units to approximately 205,000 units; of those 119,379 units, approximately
25,000 were created directly through the comprehensive permit process, leaving 94,379
units created with the statute in the background).
105. Id.
106. Stonefield, supra note 83. SeeKrefetz, supra note 69.
107. Krefetz, supra note 69, at 393.
108. See DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, CH. 40B SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING INVENTORY THROUGH OCTOBER 1, 2001 (April 24, 2002), available at
http://www.state.ma.us/dhcd/components/hac/HsInvRev.pdf (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter HOUSING INVENTORY].
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more receptive to such housing.' Only 4 communities in 1972 had
between 7 and 10% low and moderate income housing;"0 in 2001,
72 communities had over 7%, 27 of which had met the state goal of
at least 10%."' Town sentiment toward affordable housing, too,
may have changed, if only slightly. Town officials have begun to
accept the necessity of affordable housing, if only to house112 town
employees and young local families who are now priced out.

The statute has become steadily more influential with time, although a recent trend toward smaller developments has become
apparent. In the 1970s, local zoning boards denied over 40% of
comprehensive permit applications; in the 1990s, that number was
down to 20%. In the 1970s, the Housing Appeals Committee overturned 45% of the local zoning decisions; by the 1990s, it was
overturning only 25%. Moreover, the number of cases resolved by
stipulation in the Housing Appeals Committee has increased from
13% to 38%.11 3 Finally, "acceptable" affordable housing for the eld-

erly constituted approximately half of the comprehensive permit
applications in the 1970s, while only 15% in the 1990s; whereas
housing for families constituted 40% of the applications in the
1970s, and 75% in the 1990s. 1 4 The size of the proposed projects

has dramatically decreased: over half of the projects proposed in
the 1970s had 100 or more units, whereas more than half
of the
5
projects proposed in the 1990s had fewer than 50 units.
Professor Sharon Perlman Krefetz explains these data by describing a process of mutual adaptation between the state and the
communities. 6 On the local community side, it quickly became
obvious that a developer whose permit was denied would, in most
cases, be able to reverse the denial by appealing to the Housing
Appeals Committee. From this perspective, the statute's effect is
one of top-down control. Nonetheless, local boards found they had
some bargaining power in their ability to impose conditions that
the developer might accept rather than go through the time and
109. Krefetz, supra note 69, at 394.
110. Id.
111. See HOUSING INVENTORY, supra note 108. Moreover, only 44 communities possessed
at least 7% in 1997, indicating that quite a few communities approached the goal in the past
six years. See Krefetz, supra note 69, at 394.
112. See Krefetz, supra note 69, at 412; Stonefield, supra note 83, at 347 n.83. In the
1990s, affordable housing was "sold" as a way to allow young families to remain in Massachusetts, and thus a way to attract industry. See Krefetz, supra note 69, at 405-06.
113. Krefetz, supra note 69, at 401.
114. Id.
115. Id.at402.
116. Seeid. at402-15.
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expense of appealing to the Housing Appeals Committee, but that
would also render the development more acceptable to town residents.11 7 At the same time, practical experience revealed to the
Housing Appeals Committee that overturning local zoning boards
often did not mean that the proposed development was actually
built. Some communities engaged in extensive litigation, engaging
in a legal war of attrition until it no longer made economic sense
for the developer to proceed. The Housing Appeals Committee
responded by placing more emphasis on negotiated compromise
than on outright decisions in favor of one or the other
solutions
8
party."
The decrease in the size of affordable housing projects is a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, smaller projects are generally
more acceptable to the local community, and blend in better with
their surroundings. On the other hand, smaller developments
mean fewer affordable units. On average, LIP programs (which
account for the majority of units produced under he statute in recent years) produce only 6-8 affordable units per development.
Moreover, the units produced are less affordable than was previously the case. This is true since units produced under the LIP
program (the majority of units created under the statute in recent
years) do not receive any monetary subsidy. Indeed, 90% of the
units produced under LIP have been for single-family homes.",
Finally, despite the requirement of an affirmative marketing plan
to minorities, little such marketing has actually taken place, and
LIP thus has proven to be an ineffective tool in creating the housto open the suburbs to low-income
ing opportunities necessary
20
inner-city minorities.'

Because of the Massachusetts' statute's failure to ameliorate racial segregation, some commentators have expressed concern that
the statute may do more harm than good.' 2' Most data indicates
that affordable housing created under the statute overwhelmingly
benefits moderate-income whites.'22 Some of the subsidies involved
could have been used, instead, to create affordable housing for
117. Seeid.at403.
118. Seeid. at403-04.
119. See id. at 410-11; see also Stonefield, supra note 83, at 335 (arguing that marketbased programs with no subsidies will create housing affordable only to moderate-income
individuals).
120. See Krefetz, supra note 69, at 410-11. No studies have analyzed the composition, racial or otherwise, of housing created under the Massachusetts, Rhode Island, or Connecticut
statutes. See Stonefield, supra note 83, at 351. However, limited data suggests that the main
beneficiaries of these programs are white town employees. See id. at 349.
121. SeeRoisman, supranote 2.
122. See id. at 74-75.
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more needy minorities in the central city instead of moderateincome suburban whites.12 3 To the extent the statute served to spirit
away moderate-income whites to the suburb while leaving behind
low-income blacks, the statute may have exacerbated rather than
124
ameliorated segregation.

The Connecticut statute (which operates in a similar manner to
Massachusetts') achieved more modest results in terms of the creation of affordable housing than its Massachusetts counterpart,
though much of this may be explained by the state of the housing
25
market since the time the Connecticut statute was enacted.
Moreover, only superficial progress was made in Connecticut toward rendering low-income housing more palatable to local
communities. 2 6 The failure to achieve local support in Connecticut
proved fatal.
b. Local Autonomy-Both the Connecticut and Massachusetts
statutes have been plagued, since the beginning, with community
opposition. In 1987, ironically in response to an initiative designed
to make it easier for young white suburban-bred families to remain
in the suburbs, a spike in comprehensive permit applications under the Massachusetts Act led to an enormous backlash against the
statute. Local officials felt as if developers were "shoving... housing
down their throats" by proposing large-scale developments with
only the statutory minimum number of affordable units. 12 7 That
year, 24 separate bills attacking the statute were introduced into
the Massachusetts Legislature. It was in response to this opposition
that the LIP regulations were promulgated, 8 severely weakening
the Massachusetts statute by allowing relatively expensive, small,
single-family developments to qualify as affordable housing. 29 As of
this writing, the Massachusetts Act remains under fire: at the beginning of the 2003 legislative session, more than 60 bills to repeal,
0
rewrite, or otherwise modify the statute were on the agenda.1
In Connecticut, political opposition succeeded in diluting the
statute as well. Following a Connecticut Supreme Court decision

123.
124.
125.

See id. at 83-84.
See id. at 84.
See Terry J. Tondro, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Statute: After Ten Years of
Hope, Why Only MiddlingResults?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 115, 131-32 (2001).
126. See id. at 133-35.
127. Krefetz, supra note 69, at 407.
128. See id. at 408.
129. See discussion supra note 119, and accompanying text.
130. Anthony Flint, Romney Faces Tussle on Affordable Housing, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30,
2002, at Al.
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that fundamentally altered the meaning of the statute,' 3' a commission was formed to evaluate amendments to the statute.' 3 Although
the legislature enacted amendments in 2000 that undid one particularly damaging aspect of the Connecticut Supreme Court's
decision, 33 it did so at the expense of some of Act's effectiveness. In
particular, developers must now set aside more units of housing for
individuals who met stricter standards of poverty than before. Although the units that are created will be more affordable, it will
now be less profitable for developers to create affordable units.
Overall, fewer affordable units will4 be created, especially in the absence of governmental subsidies.1

Even before the amendments to the Connecticut statute, community opposition
on a local level severely impaired its
' 35
effectiveness. For instance, some towns refused to extend necessary infrastructure, such as sewer lines, to new developments.
Other towns would use their power of eminent domain to con36
demn sites on which affordable housing was to be built.1
The
approach of at least one of the architects of the statute was to try to
figure out "how to limit a town's
ability to block affordable housing
37
proposals" with these tactics.
The inherently confrontational nature of the state override statute represents a fundamental flaw in this approach. Without
community support, housing simply cannot be economically built
on a large scale. Even where developers succeed in building over
the local community's objections, the local climate is unlikely to
prove hospitable to inner-city minorities looking for affordable
housing closer to jobs. If affordable housing that truly meets the
needs of the region is to be built, it needs to be with local community support, not against local communities' wills.
131. See Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council of Glatsonbury,
735 A.2d 231, 249 (Conn. 1999) (concluding "that the need for affordable housing is to be
addressed on a local [not regional] basis" under the Connecticut appeals statute); see also
Tondro, supra note 125, at 137--52.
132. SeeTondro, supra note 125, at 152-58.
133. The Supreme Court had held that courts would review zoning board decisions
based on a deferential "sufficient evidence" standard, instead of the usual "preponderance
of the evidence" standard; and that the need to be analyzed was the town's own need, not
the regional need. The legislature reversed the first holding, but left the seconding holding
in place. See id. at 157-58.
134. See id. at 161-62.
135. See generally Peter J. Vodola, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure Law in
Practice,29 CONN. L. REv. 1235 (1997) (arguing the effectiveness of Connecticut's Act has
been tempered by widespread local opposition).
136. SeeTondro, supra note 125, at 158-59.
137. Id. at 158. Professor Tondro was the co-chair of the subcommittee that recommended the original version of the Connecticut Act. See id. at 115-16.
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c. Democratic Legitimacy-Even more than in the case of common-law adjudication, the intended beneficiaries of the housing
program are not given a voice in the process under an appeals
statute regime. Developers must act as proxies for those in need of
housing in a state-override regime. In a judicial review system, the
judge acts as a buffer against the self-interest of the developer, and
is in a position to substitute her judgment for what is best for the
regional inhabitants for that of the developer. This is less true in a
state override system, where a developer need merely ensure that
the locality has less than 10% affordable housing (in Massachusetts), and that the planned development is eligible under the
statute and administrative regulations. The pernicious nature of
this approach is best demonstrated in the cases where the developer will not choose to build. For instance, to the extent they are
permitted, developers will build the smallest permissible percentage of moderate income housing, with the remainder of the units
sold or rented at market rates. Worse, under a system such as LIP,
developers can be "bought off' by town officials, who can eliminate
years of litigation and delay, if they will agree to abide by towndictated restrictions, such as the creation of only single-family
homes. In this situation, no judge is ever even involved, and the
voice of the low-income would-be residents is completely lost.
Moreover, the lack of an enforceable minority marketing requirement makes the override tool an ineffective one in the fight
against segregation. Of course, as noted earlier, if a community is
fundamentally opposed to a development, then no amount of
marketing is likely to convince an inner-city minority family to
move in. Nonetheless, even where a locality supports a development the builders are unlikely to go out of their way to market it to
inner-city families. Nor is the locality likely to press the issue. Thus,
from a marketing perspective, those most in need of the housing
once again do not have their interests represented.
In many ways, a state override tool is more effective than the judicial review system. The numbers bear this out: significant
numbers of new units have been created in states with override
tools.

13 8"

Nonetheless, the affordable housing built in Massachusetts,

and Connecticut, has not had a significant impact on concentrated
poverty.39 More is needed. The low-income residents must be
138. See Stonefield, supra note 83, at 328-29. However, of the new units created, only a
small percentage have been affordable. Id. at 329.
139. See Tondro, supra note 125, at 131-36; Stonefield, supra note 83, at 341-49 (evaluating state override tools in Massachusetts, NewJersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island).
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welcomed; this will come only with community support for the project. Moreover, the low-income community
must be represented at
40
the table where the decisions are made.

C. Centralized PlanningModel

States with centralized planning go one step further. Rather
than leaving local zoning intact except where a developer chooses
to challenge it, these schemes subject local zoning to state oversight. In the paradigmatic case, a state agency is responsible for
evaluating a local comprehensive plan to ensure that it meets state
guidelines with respect to a number of factors, of which adequate
affordable housing is one. Localities are free to enact their own
zoning ordinances, but the ordinances must conform to the stateapproved comprehensive plan.
New Jersey, 4 ' California, 42 Oregon, 43 Rhode Island, 44 Florida, 5
Washington,

46

and Connecticut

47

each have elements of a central-

ized planning model. California's regime and Connecticut's pilot
program are unique, and are considered in Part II. The representative approaches of NewJersey and Oregon are evaluated below.
48
1. New Jersey's FairHousingAct-New Jersey's Fair Housing Act,'
passed as a legislative response to Mt Laurel II, aims to encourage
municipalities to draft their zoning ordinances in an inclusionary
manner without resorting to adversarial proceedings. It does so by
140. African American urban families do not always agree with the agenda of creating
housing in the suburbs. See Stonefield, supra note 83, at 348. Were they represented in the
decision-making process, one of two results might ensue. First, they may, feeling thus empowered, change their minds and decide that the benefits of desegregation outweigh their
objections. Second, they may influence the distribution of affordable housing created in the
suburbs so as to take their concerns into account.
141. See infra Part I.C.1.
142. See infra Part I1.B.1.
143. See infra Part I.C.2.
144. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22.2-13(a) (1999 &Supp. 2002); see a/SOJOHN M. DEGROVE,
PLANNING AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES 85-98 (1992).
145. See FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3161-163.3215 (2002); see also Charles E. Connerly & Marc
Smith, Developing a FairShare HousingPolicy for Horida, 12J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 63, 68-69
(1996).
146. See WASH. REv. CODE ch. 36.70A (2003); see alsoJennifer M. Morgan, Zoningfor All:
Using Inclusionary Zoning Techniques to Promote Affordable Housing, 44 EMORY L.J. 359, 376
(1995).
147. See infra Part II.B.2.
148. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003). See McDougall,
Litigation, supra note 50, at 635-42. The statute's constitutionality was confirmed in Hills
Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 634 (1986).
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turning the builder's remedy stick into a carrot: zoning ordinances
of municipalities that comply with the provisions of the statute will
enjoy a presumption of validity. 4' In so doing, the legislature consciously changed the atmosphere of fair housing issues in New
Jersey from one of pervasive battles between towns against builders,
suburbanites against urban dwellers, and the rich against the 15poor,
seat. 0
into one in which rational planning would take the front
In order to gain the presumption of validity for its zoning ordinances, a municipality must submit a zoning ordinance containing
a "housing element" to the Council on Affordable Housing
(COAH). 15 It may then request that COAH grant a substantive certification of its ordinance. 152 During the certification process,
interested parties have an opportunity to object. 53 COAH attempts
to mediate any objections; if it is unable to, parties may request an
administrative hearing. 154 The council will grant substantive certification if there are no objections (or objections are overruled on
appeal), and the council finds the municipality's housing element
satisfactory in view of the standards set forth in the statute and by
regulation. In making its determination, the council considers
the creation of the municipality's
whether the ordinance facilitates
5 6
fair share of regional housing.

A party wishing to challenge the zoning practice of a municipality possessing substantive certification faces an uphill battle. The
parties to such a dispute must first submit to COAH-sponsored
mediation."5 If mediation fails, the case may go before an administrative law judge1 5 and, if necessary, to trial.' 9 In all cases, the
zoning ordinance enjoys a strong presumption of validity. 6 Thus,
there is a strong incentive for parties to object at the initial stage,
where a municipality first seeks certification of its zoning ordinance, rather than to seek a builder's remedy by filing litigation
after the municipality has been certified.
149. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-317(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
150. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-303 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
151. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003). See also N.J.
§ 52:27D-305 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (creating COAH).
152. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-313 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
153. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-314 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
154. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-315 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
155. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-314 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
156. SeeN.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307(c) (1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
157. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003). But see N.J.
§ 52:27D-318 (2001 & Supp. 2003).
158. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-315(c) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-316(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-317(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).

STAT. ANN.

STAT. ANN.
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The New Jersey scheme is, in reality, a combination of all three
approaches addressed in this Note. The background threat of the
builder's remedy retains aspects of the judicial review scheme; the
highly intricate procedures to be followed in the event of ajudicial
challenge, set forth by Mt. Laurel II, evoke the Massachusetts appeals statute. At the same time, COAH's central role in approving
development plans (and the relative rarity with which the builder's
remedy is now to be invoked) places New Jersey's current system
squarely within the centralized planning category.
One additional feature, regional contribution agreements
(RCAs), is central to the statute. Under this system, suburbs may
purchase the right to transfer up to 50% of their fair share of affordable housing to another municipality (typically an inner city,
which already possesses a surfeit of affordable housing). 6' Municipalities may pass the cost on to developers by requiring a payment
in lieu of the construction of affordable housing from the developers. 162 This system has been widely criticized. The amount of
remuneration taken away by the inner city is likely to be insufficient, resulting from an inequality in bargaining power between
the city and the suburb. 63 On the flip side, there is no restriction
on how the receiving city uses the funds. It might divert the money
it receives from regional contribution agreements to high-end
housing, creating a system of gentrification that will displace the
indigent individuals the statute was designed to help. 164 Finally, to
the extent that RCAs cause inner cities to retain high percentages
of a region's affordable housing, the regional contribution agreement scheme fails to address the social ills that result from
concentrated poverty. Moreover, such a system fails to address
166
pressing issues of racial segregation.
Partially addressing some of these concerns, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently considered a case in which developers,
under a town ordinance, made payments to the town's affordable
housing fund rather than actually setting aside affordable housing.167 The payments were to contribute partially to the town's
Regional Contribution Agreement payments, and partially to reha161. SeeN.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
162. See, e.g., Bi-County Dev. of Clinton, Inc. v. High Bridge, 805 A.2d 433 (NJ. 2002).
163. McDougall, Litigation,supra note 50, at 682-83.
164. Id. at 683.
165. See, e.g., Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, supranote 3.
166. See Roisman, supra note 2.
167. See Bi-County Dev. of Clinton Inc. v. High Bridge, 805 A.2d 433 (NJ. 2002); Note,
Refining Municipal Obligations Under Mount Laurel, the New Jersey Supreme Court Hints at a New
Conception of Regional Responsibility, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1541 (2003) [hereinafter Note, Refining Municipal Obligations].
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bilitating other housing.168 The Court refused to grant developers
who make in-lieu payments the same right to demand services, in
this case the right to connect to a neighboring municipality's sewer
system, as it would a developer who had actually created the housing.6"' 9 The Court thus portended a sort of second-class status for
payments in lieu of the actual creation of affordable housing. 7 °
2. Oregon--Oregon municipalities are required to establish
comprehensive land-use plans and submit them to the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) for review and
approval. 7' However, the statute specifies little in the way of specific housing policies. 72 Instead, the specifics were left to the LCDC
to develop. The Commission arrived at nineteen different statewide goals. 73 Goal 10, the housing goal, provides that "plans shall
encourage the availability of adequate numbers of needed housing
units at price ranges and rent levels which are commensurate with
the financial capabilities of Oregon households ..

'.

The vague-

ness of this standard left housing advocates initially with little room
for enthusiasm.
However, in its first review interpreting Goal 10, the LCDC
broadly interpreted the requirement to provide affordable housing. In an early decision, the LCDC held that local planning must
76
take into account regionalgoals, not just the needs of the locality.
while stopping
It explicitly referred to the Mt. Laurel decisions,
77
short of requiring a strict fair share model.

168. Bi-County, 805 A.2d at 449.
169. Id. ("[W]e decline to elevate Bi-County's status to equal that of Samaritan, a nonprofit builder of low income housing whose entire project could have failed without access
to water and sewer capacity from a neighboring municipality.").
170. Note, Refining Municipal Obligations, supra note 167, at 1545-46 (arguing that the
Court was skeptical about whether affordable housing fees would be as effective as mandatory set-asides in the creation of affordable housing).
171.
See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-850 (2001); Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should
Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1,73 (2001).

172.

Span, supra note 171, at 73.

173. See OREGON DEPARTMENT OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OREGON'S
19 STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS AND GUIDELINES, available at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/

goalhtml/goals.html (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
174. See OREGON DEPARTMENT OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GOAL
available at http://www.lcd.state.or.us/goalpdfs/goall0.pdf

10,

(on file with the University of

Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
175. SeeSpan, supra note 171, at 74 n.320.
176. See Terry D. Morgan, Exclusionary Zoning: Remedies Under Oregon's Land Use Planning
Program,14 ENVTL. L. 779, 783 (1984).
177. See id.
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The LCDC also promulgated a Metropolitan Housing Rule for
the Portland area. 7" The rule has two components. 179 First, each
municipality and county in the area must adopt a comprehensive
plan permitting at least 50% of new housing to be multi-family or
attached single family units.'s8 Second, minimum density requirements are set forth for new construction within the metropolitan
181
area.
The Oregon system does not provide any incentives for developers of low-income housing, per se. Instead, the regime aims at
increasing affordability uniformly.'82 Outside the Portland area, the
LCDC requires "soft fair share" apportionment, i.e., it requires that
municipalities attempt to provide, in their comprehensive plans,
for the housing that approximates their fair share of housing 8 ' for4
their region, without specifying exactly the fair share numbers.
Inside the Portland area, the LCDC promulgates specific numerical targets for municipalities.11'5

In 1979, the Oregon legislature transferred the responsibility for
hearing challenges to local decisions from the LCDC to a threemember board called the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA).''6

The LCDC continues to "acknowledge," or certify, local plans to
ensure their constituency with regional goals. LUBA has jurisdiction over appeals from local individualized decisions, and limits its
review to the question of whether the decision was in accordance
with the local comprehensive plan. 8 7 LUBA has been well-received
as more expert, more efficient, and faster than the courts.1"
Oregon's approach is almost entirely centralized with an administrative agency. Although localities initially draft their
comprehensive plans, the plans are subject to scrutiny by the
LCDC, which ascertains the degree to which the plan matches the
planning goals it has set forth. In the Portland area, the freedom of
the localities is even more curtailed, with specific housing numbers
mandated by the LCDC. The courts have almost no role to play.

178.
179.

OR. ADMIN. R. §§ 660-007-0000 to 60-007-0060 (2001).
See Span, supranote 171, at 75-76.

180.

OR. ADMIN.

181.
182.
183.
housing
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

R. 660-007-0030 (2001).

660-007-0035 (2001).
See Span, supranote 171, at 76.
Note that the fair share requirement is of housing generally, not of affordable
specifically.
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.312, 197.475-.490 (2001).
See id.
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.805-.860 (2001).
OR. REv. STAT. § 197.015(10) (2001). See also Span, supra note 171, at 77 n.337.
See Span, supranote 171, at 77.
OR. ADMIN. R.
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Structurally, then, the Oregon system represents an extreme, administratively-centered position.
3. Analysis-Extensive empirical data is available for New Jersey
and Oregon. One New Jersey study"8 9 identified three goals central
to the Mt. Laurel litigation: increasing housing opportunities for
low- and moderate-income households; providing housing opportunities in the suburbs for poor urbanites who had previously been
excluded from the suburbs; and ameliorating racial and ethnic
segregation by allowing blacks and Latinos to move to white suburbs. 9 With respect to the first goal, the study found that the New
Jersey Fair Housing Act did, generally speaking, increase the
amount of low- and moderate-income housing in the state. Moreover, the category of households with the greatest amount of need
(minority, female-headed, single-parent, and young households)
represented a significant proportion of the families taking advantage of housing created under the Act. The study noted, however,
that large households, and very low-income households, seemed to
be underrepresented in the population applying for and occupying the newly-created housing.' 9'
Regarding the second goal, the NewJersey study concluded that
very few urban residents were actually moving into the suburbs.
Only 15% of the suburban households were occupied by individuals who had previously lived in an urban area.' 92 Thus, although
housing is being created, the inhabitants are generally not those
who were formerly barred by exclusionary zoning.
Related to this finding is the study's conclusion with respect to
the third goal: The New Jersey Act did not bring about desegregation. Indeed, only 5% of blacks in housing created under the Act
(Affordable Housing Management Service, '" or AHMS, housing)
moved from the city to the suburbs, while 21% moved from the
suburbs to the cities. Similarly, only 2% of Latinos in AHMS housing moved from the cities to the suburbs. Overall, only 7% of the
households moved from the city to the suburbs.' 94 The result is that
81% of the AHMS households in the suburbs are occupied by
whites, while 85% of the AHMS households in the cities are occupied by blacks and Latinos. One explanation for this phenomenon
189. See Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 50.
190. Id. at 1301-02
191. Id. at 1301.
192. Id. at 1302.
193. The Affordable Housing Management Service is a NewJersey state agency created
under the Fair Housing Act to administer housing created under the Act. Id. at 1281.
194. Id. at 1302.
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is that black households tend to apply for housing at uniformly
high rates throughout the state, whereas white households only
apply for housing in suburban areas. 195 Whites, in other words, are
willing to apply for AHMS housing only when they will not have to
move to an urban (and predominantly minority) neighborhood,
while blacks are willing to live in a majority-white or majorityminority area. Moreover, in regions that include New Jersey's largest cities, the highest numbers of minorities, and the greatest
number of applicants for AHMS housing, there were the fewest
suburban housing opportunities. In regions where there were
fewer applicants and fewer minorities, there were more suburban
housing

opportunities. 9

Thus, whatever the benefits of the

scheme in terms of creating raw housing, it does not serve to ameliorate racial segregation.
Similarly mixed results are found in a study of Oregon. The
study concluded that, the LCDC had considerable impact on zoning ordinances in the Portland metropolitan area. For instance,
the amount of land zoned for multi-family dwellings in the Portland metropolitan area quadrupled between 1977-1982, from
7.2% to 27%. With only 10% additional land zoned residential during this timeframe, the total number of housing units increased by
150%.'17 Furthermore, overall density increased (on paper), with
the average lot size decreasing from 12,800 square feet to 8,280
square feet.' 98
However, the actual density of units built on the newly zoned
lots did not increase as much as was hoped. First, single-family
units only covered 66% of the land zoned for single-family uses, as
opposed to 90% coverage for multi-family units.1 99 Second, outside
the Portland area (and, thus, outside the ambit of the Metropolitan Housing Rule 2°), very low percentages of new housing were

multi-family housing, and housing covered a much lower percentage of land area allowed under zoning ordinances than in the
Portland area.20 ' Even in the Portland area, it is not clear that the

Housing Rule was uniquely responsible for the high levels of multifamily development. Development patterns in the late 1980s (after
the Housing Rule was promulgated) resembled those in the early
1970s (before the Housing Rule), implying that market factors may
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304.
Span, supra note 171, at 78.
Id.
Id. at 78-79.
See supra Part I.C.2.
Span, supra note 171, at 79.
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631

have had more impact than regulatory factors. °2 Overall, the
LCDC appears to have had some positive effect in the construction
of at least moderate-income, multi-family housing in the Portland
region. With respect to housing for low-income individuals , and
with respect to housing outside the Portland metropolitan area,
the numbers are less clear.0 4
Some of the failures of the New Jersey and Oregon approaches
may be explained by structural elements in the programs themselves. First, the New Jersey scheme, in particular, suffers from the
fatal flaw of regional contribution agreements. Regional contribution agreements are easy to blame. They permit more affordable
housing to be created in the central cities, albeit with some degree
of compensation from the suburbs. If the New Jersey study is accurate in its hypothesis that blacks apply for affordable housing
wherever it is available, whereas whites apply for affordable housing only in the suburbs, °' then the more affordable housing built
in the central cities, the more segregation will occur.
Second, the top-down nature of planning in NewJersey, Oregon,
and most of the other centralized-planning states, is also likely to
decrease its effectiveness because localities are not treated as partners in the process. The failure to involve a locality in the creation
of its own affordable housing leads to greatly reduced effectiveness
in desegregation, if not in the actual creation of affordable housing. For instance, a locality will not affirmatively market its
affordable housing to urban residents; it will do its best to fill the
housing with "acceptable" locals. Moreover, for those minority urbanites who are made aware of the housing, few are likely choose
to move to an unwelcoming municipality with a tiny minority
population. Finally, a determined municipality might fight affordable housing in its midst through legal tactics such as by seizing of
the property through eminent domain. Creating affordable housing despite community opposition is therefore unlikely to be
effective.
In terms of creating new housing, centralized planning schemes
are as effective as, or more effective than, either of the other two
approaches examined in this Note. They may be particularly

202. Id. at 79-80.
203. No data is available breaking down the housing attributable to the LCDC according to the income level of the residents. Thus, we do not know how much low-income
housing compared to moderate-income housing has been created. See id. at 78.
204.
205.

See id. at 81-82.
See Wish & Eisdorfer, supra note 50, at 1303.
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effective at setting norms.2" They are not particularly effective at
getting inner city residents to move to the newly-created housing in
the suburbs. Individual factors, such as regional contribution
agreements, may decrease their effectiveness at certain goals, such
as desegregation. Moreover, these approaches exhibit a fundamental lack of community support, and thus of democratic
legitimization. 207
D. Regional Governments: Montgomery County, Maryland

Without state prompting, Montgomery County, Maryland20 8 has
enacted what may be the most successful program to create affordable housing in the country.' ° Under the Montgomery County
ordinance, 2 ' all developments with 50 or more units must contain
at least 15% moderately priced units.2 1 ' Montgomery County pro-

vides a density bonus, permitting the development of one market
unit for each moderately-priced unit, even where this would otherwise conflict with the zoning ordinance. Economic feasibility may
also be provided by state or federal subsidies. Moderate-income
families must be given priority to inhabit the moderately-priced
units. Moderately-priced units for sale generally may not be resold
at a higher price for five years; and the rent may not be raised on a
moderately-priced rental for five years. Moreover, housing authorities are given an option to purchase moderately-priced units, thus
212
opening up the suburbs to low-income residents as well.

206. That is, they are able to set rules instead of standards. By contrast, the common law
model, for the most part, allowed only for vague standards. Under appeals statute regimes, a
heuristic (e.g., Massachusetts' 10% rule) is employed, for lack of an administrative apparatus
to determine hard fair share numbers. Centralized planning regimes are not, however, immune from the possibility of creating imprecise norms, as was the case in Oregon outside
the Portland area.
207. An exploration of the central planning model's democratic implications will be
explored infra Part II.B.3.
208. Most Maryland residents do not live in municipalities. Thus, Montgomery County
is the smallest unit of local government for virtually all of its inhabitants. DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME OUTSIDE GAME

209.

See id. at 183-84.

210.

MONTGOMERY

184--85 (1999) [hereinafter

COUNTY,

MD., CODE ch.

INSIDE/OUTSIDE].

25A (2003), available at http://www.
2

amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Maryland/Montgomery%2OCounty/Montgomery% 0County%
20Code/partOO004/chapter052.htm?f=templates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$q=Chapter%2025A$X
=Simple#LPHIT1 (on file with the University of Michiganjournal of Law Reform).
211. Id. § 25A-5(c) (3). See also HERBERT M. FRANKLIN ET AL., IN-ZONING: A GUIDE FOR
POLICY-MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS

212.

See id. at 140-41.

140 (Appendix to Part IV) (1974).
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By all accounts, Montgomery County's program has been successful. Between 1974 and 1997, 10,110 affordable units were
created, including 7,305 units for sale and 2,805 units for rental.
More than 1,500 of these units were purchased and converted into
public housing.1 3 Moreover, by the nature of the program, housing
is spread throughout the county, not just in lower-income areas.
One study determined that property values of neighboring higherpriced units were not adversely affected by the proximity of lowand moderate-income housing214-perhaps partially due to the uniform distribution of the housing.1 5 Purchasers of the affordable
housing were 41% white, 22% black, 28% Asian, and 7% Hispanic. 16 Moreover, 80% of the inhabitants of the public housing
(which is mixed with market rate units) are black. 2 7' Thus, the

Montgomery County legislation successfully achieves significant
racial and socioeconomic integration-unlike any of the other
programs studied in this Note.
One could draw the conclusion from the Montgomery County
experience that local governments inhibit the construction of affordable housing; if there are no municipalities (as in Montgomery
County) then there will be no resistance to the creation of affordable housing. Indeed, David Rusk, an enthusiastic supporter of the
Montgomery County initiative,2 9 argued:
A broad-based government is not generally as afflicted with
the "Not-in-My-Backyard" syndrome as is a narrow-based government. A broad-based government can carry out zoning
policies and capital outlay plans that encourage the private
market to bring more mixed-income neighborhoods into being. Within its wide jurisdiction a broad-based government is
able to scatter public housing projects and implement rent
subsidy programs across a variety of neighborhoods. It is, in
effect, able to follow strategies of dispersion of low-income
groups.... [A] highly fragmented metro area has little ability

213.
214.
215.
housing
216.
217.
218.
219.

supra note 208, at 191.
Id.
That is, if affordable housing is created simultaneously everywhere in a region,
prices should not be affected because residents cannot flee somewhere else.
INSIDE/OuTSIDE, supra note 208, at 191.
Roisman, supra note 2, at 79.
See id. at 78-79.
SeeINSIDE/OuTSIDE, supra note 208, at 178-200.
INSIDE/OUTSIDE,
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to agree on socially controversial policies, absent powerful
compulsion by state or federal law. °
Rusk's observations are supported on both ends. For instance, in
Connecticut, negotiation between local governments failed to produce a fair-share agreement; and the agreement it did produce
could not be adequately enforced. By contrast, Montgomery
County was able to effectively disperse its poor, in particular its
poor minorities, throughout the jurisdiction.
It may be, however, that what allowed Montgomery County to
pass the ordinance was not the county's governmental reach per
se, but rather its democratic support. The Montgomery County
ordinance owes its existence first, to a persistent council member,
and second, to the influence of coalition politics."' Business, civic,
religious, and housing groups came together to support the bill.2
One council member took on the bill's passage as his "personal
crusade."2 3 In short, representative democracy, in which the greatest good for the greatest number in the region held sway over
policy decisions, set the stage for the bill's passage.
To the extent that a similarly situated democratic minority in a
highly fragmented metropolitan area2 2 4 would be incapable of enacting an ordinance such as Montgomery County's, Rusk is
undoubtedly correct that Montgomery County's form of government is superior. However, one need not draw the conclusion that
an all-powerful regional government must displace all local control. There does need to be a body to represent the will of the
region's inhabitants as a whole. That body, however, can operate in
concert with local governments, rather than replacing them.
II.

PROMISING ELEMENTS

Despite the shortcomings inherent in each of the models presented above, significant promise exists. First, the appeals statute
model and the centralized planning model each have inherent
strengths and weaknesses. It is possible to take the strongest elements from these approaches and fix their weaknesses. Second,
220. DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 86 (1993).
221. See INSIDE/OUTSIDE, supra note 208, at 186-90 (describing the events leading to
the passage of the Montgomery County ordinance).
222. Id. at 189.
223. Id.
224. I.e., a metropolitan area with numerous autonomous localities.
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two states, Connecticut and California, have undertaken to add a
degree of local representation to otherwise centralized-planning
models.' Although neither of these approaches can be termed a
success, they resolve some of the theoretical problems inherent in
the appeals statute and centralized planning approach. By extracting the successful elements from each of the regimes studied thus
far, adding the local representation exhibited by California and
Connecticut, and rendering the system more democratic, one may
arrive at a successful solution.
A. Expert Agencies Effectively Ascertain CredibleFairShare Numbers
Only a centralized, expert regional agency can accomplish the
task of arriving at a statistically accurate picture of the housing
need of a region. The variables involved in such a calculation are
extremely varied and complex.2 Localities lack the resources, the
access to data, the expertise, and the incentive to undertake a regional housing needs assessment on their own. By contrast, COAH
in New Jersey, and LCDC in Oregon, are expert agencies adept at
allocating a region's fair share of affordable housing, as well as dividing the region's share among its constituent municipalities. In
California, a state agency determines statewide housing need and
approves the determinations of regional need arrived at by regional councils of government.2 2 7 Such an expert determination of
housing need is vital not only for technocratic purposes; it also
functions as a legitimizing tool. A major complaint levied against
the Massachusetts appeals statute is that the 10% threshold 228 is too

coarse a standard, and does not accurately measure when a locality
is or is not providing enough affordable housing. A technically accurate standard is the only way to respond to such a charge.

225. The Connecticut scheme described is entirely independent of its appeals statute
approach. See infra Part II.B.1.
226. For a graphic demonstration of this proposition, see Regional Housing Needs Assessment Calculator for Southern California, available at http://api.ucla.edu/rhna/
RegionalHousingNeedsAssessment/FinalNumbers/Main.cfm (on file with the University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
227. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65584(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003). See also infta Part II.B.1.
228. See discussion supra p. 31.
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B. RepresentativeRegionalEntities Acquire Local Support

At least two states, Connecticut and California, have addressed
the affordable housing issue by delegating the responsibility for
creating affordable housing to regional organizations in which the
localities are represented. Neither of these states' programs have
been particularly successful, either because of the modesty of the
goals set (in the case of Connecticut) or because of the lack of enforcement power vested in the regional organizations (in both
instances). Nonetheless, the basic idea of involving the localities
collectively in decisions that affect them collectively is an essential
step.
1. California--California's statutory scheme involves a combination of the three forms of inclusionary zoning enforcement
detailed in this Note.220 California provides for centralized review of
zoning ordinances, and a judicial enforcement mechanism, applying both common law and statutory appeals-like provisions.
California's implementation of these elements is weak and ineffective. Nonetheless, California's structural approach contains unique
elements that may be borrowed by a successful approach.
Under California law, all localities must adopt a general plan
containing a number of mandatory elements, including a housing
element. 230 Zoning ordinances must be consistent with the general
plan. 23 ' The housing element must meet local needs for all income
levels, and must include provisions for rental housing, factory-built
housing, and mobile homes.3 2 A community's "local needs" are to
be assessed as a portion of the regional need for housing. The
regional need, and each locality's fair share, is initially determined
by a regional council of governments established by the localities
themselves.2 34 The determination of the regional need is subject to

229. See McDougall, Litigation, supra note 50, at 643-45; Nico Calavita et al., Inclusionary
Housing in California and New Jersey, 8 HoUsING POL'y DEBATE 109,117-18 (1997).
230. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65300 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (requiring the adoption of a
general plan); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302(c) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (requiring that the
plan include a housing element); CAL. Gov'T CODE tit. 7 div. 1 ch. 3 art. 10.6 (West 1997 &

Supp. 2003) (setting forth the requirements of the housing element).
231. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 65860(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
232.
233.

CAL. GoV'T CODE § 65583 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65583(a)(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); CAL. GoV'T CODE

§ 65584 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
234. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65584(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65582(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (defining "council of governments"); CAL. GoVT
CODE § 6500 et seq. (West 1997 & Supp. 2003) (establishing the authority of localities to create "joint power authorities").
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approval of and modification by the state Department of Housing
and Community Development.2 1 5 The allocation of local needs is
only subject to state "advice." The council of governments may directly allocate fair share housing to cities and counties, or it may
allocate housing shares to subregions, which would then allocate
the housing to cities and counties. 36 Each locality is required to
have a state agency certify that the housing elements of their comprehensive plan meets the locality's regionally-assessed housing
need.2 7
Significantly, the statute does not set forth the methodology by
which localities are to be allocated their fair share, although the
methodology used must be made public.238 Different councils of
governments arrive at different criteria for distributing the fair
share burden. For instance, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), the council of governments for the San Francisco
Bay Area, defines a locality's fair share of housing as the average of
that locality's needs, the needs of its county, and the needs of its
region. " The Southern California Association of Governments
(SCAG) takes into account four factors projected over seven years:
household growth, vacancy need,240 replacement need,24I and a "fair
share adjustment. 2 42 All numbers are calculated on a local level;
only the last factor is intended to spread the burden of low-income
housing across the region. 43 Localities have separate goals for
housing for each of four categories of individuals: very low-, low-,
moderate-, and above-moderate income.2 "
Although the California approach provides an effective mechanism for the identification of fair share burdens, it is ineffective in
enforcing its requirements.24 First, because the statute does not
require the locality to build housing, or even to act affirmatively to
encourage housing to be built, judicial review focuses on whether
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65584(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).

242.

SOUTHERN

Id.
GoV'T CODE § 65585(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
GOV'T CODE § 65584(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
See Field, supra note 31, at 42.
I.e., additional units needed to maintain an "ideal" vacancy rate.
I.e., number of units projected to be demolished or converted to non-housing use.
CAL.
CAL.

CALIFORNIA

ASSOCIATION

OF

GOVERNMENTS,

REGIONAL

HOUSING

2-3 (2000), available at http://api.ucla.edu/rhna/
RegionalHousingNeedsAssessment/RHNABackground/RhnaPolicy/PDF1MethodologyFina
l.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
243. See id. at 3.
244. See id. at 2.
245. See Field, supra note 31, at 70 ("The courts have failed to comprehensively and effectively enforce the fair share statutes."); Calavita et al., supra note 229, at 117-18.
NEEDS ASSESSMENT:

METHODOLOGY

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 37:2

the housing element is in technical conformity with the law, rather
than whether affordable housing is getting built.2 41 Second, and

more significantly, neither the councils of governments nor the
Department of Housing and Community Development play any
role in enforcing the statute. All enforcement is through the judicial system. Thus, although localities under the law must submit a
general plan, and the general *plan must include a housing element, and the housing element must conform to the Regional
Housing Needs Assessment promulgated by the local council of
governments and be certified by the Department of Housing and
Community Development, none of these requirements may be enforced except
by a private party, such as in a suit for a builder's
247
remedy.
California provides two mechanisms to challenge local zoning.
First, under California law local zoning boards may not refuse
permission to build low income housing except under specific,
enumerated conditions. 4s A developer may appeal a zoning denial,
in which case (as in Connecticut) the locality has the burden of
proof to show that those conditions are met. 249 Second, California
allows developers (or, indeed, low-income individuals, or other interested parties) to facially challenge a locality's zoning ordinance
by seeking a writ of mandate to order the locality to meet its statutory duties.2 5° As in New Jersey, if a locality's plan is found to be in
compliance with the statutory scheme by the Department of Housing and Community Development, the plan will enjoy a
presumption of validity in court:21 If a court finds the plan's housing element not to be in compliance with the statute, the court
252
may order compliance within 120 days. In its order, the court
may also suspend the right of the locality to issue building permits
251
or to amend its zoning ordinances or grant zoning variances.
Thus, the California judiciary appears to have an impressive arsenal at its disposal to enforce compliance with the housing element
requirement.

246. See Calavita et al., supra note 229, at 118.
247. See Brian Augusta, Building Housingfrom the Ground Up, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
503, 513-14 (1999).
248. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65589.5(d) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
249. CAL. GoVT CODE § 65589.6 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
250. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 65751 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 1085 (West 1980 & Supp. 2003).
251. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65589.3 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
252. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65754(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
253. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65 7 55(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
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Nonetheless, the California statute has proven a disappointment.2 5 4 First, in some cases, localities manipulated data and

methodologies in order to appear to be in compliance while producing little affordable housing. 5 Second, although localities are
required to identify sites suitable to support development, the statute's requirements in this area are vague enough that localities
may submit a plan that appears to be in conformity to the statute,
while in reality leaving no sites available for development.' 6 Third,
although low-income individuals themselves are able to sue under
the California system, their low level of access to representation
means that they could only sporadically influence local policy
through litigation.2 7 Fourth, developers are reluctant to bring suit
because of high legal costs and fear of souring relations with a locality in which they may wish to later to business.2 5 Fifth, a sizeable

number of California municipalities are simply not in conformance
with the law. Sixth, compliance with the statute is not necessarily
a good statistical indicator of housing construction. 6 °

254.

See PAUL G. LEWIS, CALIFORNIA'S HOUSING ELEMENT LAW: THE ISSUE OF LOCAL

64 (2003), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/R203PLR.pdf
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
255. See McDougall, Litigation, supra note 50, at 644-45 ("In some cases, suburban municipalities met the letter of the law in their planning and implementation procedures, but
used data selectively and took advantage of the ambiguities in data projections in order to
avoid their obligations for lower-income housing."). In 1990, the statute was amended to
require, inter alia, that localities report more data about the assumptions and methodologies
they employ. 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 1441 (S.B. 2274) § 4 (codified as amended at CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 65584 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003)).
256. See Augusta, supra note 247, at 542-43.
257. Field, supra note 31, at 50-52.
258. Id. at 52-53. This is another restatement of the question of democratic legitimacy.
259. As of April 2, 2003, only 57.9% of California municipalities had adopted housing
elements that were certified, as required, by the state Department of Housing and Community Development. 15.8% of municipalities had adopted non-compliant housing elements;
18.2% of localities had not adopted housing elements at all (or were in the process of doing
so); 6.4% of municipalities' housing elements were being reviewed by the state; and 1.7% of
municipalities had taken advantage of SANDAG's self-certification procedure. See discussion
infra note 376, and accompanying text. See also CAL. DEP'T OF HoUS. AND CITY. DEV., HousING ELEMENT COMPLIANCE REPORT (Apr. 2, 2003), availableat http://www.hcd.ca.gov/hpd/
hrc/plan/he/status.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
260. See LEWIS, supra note 254, at 68-69 ("Compliance status ... was not a good predictor of the rate of subsequent new housing development in [certain] cities.... Rather,
housing market and demographic factors outweigh compliance status in contributing to
variations in growth rates."). Nonetheless, compliance with the housing element requirement may increase the production of affordable units at the expense of market rate units. Id.
at 69 ("Indeed, when examining the proportion of all units constructed from 1991 through
2000 that were in multifamily developments-most likely to be affordable-we do find that
multifamily construction tends to displace a significant portion of single-family construction
in cities with compliant housing elements.").
NONCOMPLIANCE
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The most fundamental barrier to the effectiveness of the statute,
however, lies in its reliance on courts for enforcement. California
courts do not delve below the text of the locality's ordinance, and
are unwilling to assess the contents or practical impact of a locality's housing element. They employ a "substantial compliance"
standard which in practice means "facial compliance." That is, the
decision is whether the housing element contains each of the
components in the statute, and not whether the housing element
actually attempts to meet any of the statute's goals.26' Courts are
also unwilling to consider extrinsic evidence as to the actual effect
of the housing element; they analyze the text of the element, and
nothing more. 62 In other words, the California statute has not succeeded in reversing the intrinsic conservatism and deference to
local legislatures that is characteristic of courts, as shown in
Part L.A. 262
2. 264Connecticut-In its Regional Fair Housing Compact Pilot Program, Connecticut established a program encouraging localities
to come together regionally to develop a fair share housing strategy through negotiation rather than through state mandate.265 In
1990, the Capitol Region Council of Governments (representing
the Hartford region) and the Greater Bridgeport Regional Planning Agency were chosen to participate in the program.2

6

6

The Act

calls for negotiation between a mediator, a state representative,
representatives from the regional planning agency, and representatives from each municipality.2 67 Thus, in a manner similar to
California's statute, Connecticut hoped to allow localities to resolve
261. Field, supra note 31, at 54 ("[C]ourts are unwilling to evaluate the substance of localities' housing elements. Instead, they limit themselves to reviewing facial compliance with
the housing element law."). See also, e.g., Buena Vista Gardens v. City of San Diego Planning
Dep't, 220 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1985) (finding a city's housing element in "substantial compliance" with a statute requiring cities to "'assist' in the development of housing to meet the
needs of low- and moderate-income households," despite the skeletal nature of the assistance allegedly provided).
262. Field, supra note 31, at 57. See also Camp v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors,
176 Cal. Rptr. 620, 635 (1981).
263. Indeed, the courts themselves recognize this limitation. One court opined that it:
[C]annot and should not involve itself in detailed analysis of whether the elements of
the plan are adequate to achieve its purpose. To do so would involve the court in the
writing of the plan. That issue is one for determination by the political process and
not by the judicial process.
Bownds
264.
265.
266.
267.

v. City of Glendale, 170 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (1981).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-386 (2003).
Id. SeealsoConnerly& Smith, supranote 145, at 89.
Connerly & Smith, supra note 145, at 89.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-386 (2003).
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their region's affordable housing issues through mediation rather
than through state mandates.
Three significant structural elements were present in the Connecticut system. First, municipalities were not proportionally
represented; instead, one representative per municipality was provided for.2 6 Second, only municipalities, regions, and the state were
to be represented. Citizens' groups, such as housing advocacy
groups, had no formal voice, though they could observe and speak
at a separate public forum.2

"

Third, the council was to operate by

consensus. 270

The final document was to be adopted unanimously.
Thus, each municipality had a veto power, since each could derail
the negotiations by threatening to leave.2 7' As a result, the central

city's voice was more likely to be softened in the debate than if a
majority-voting rule had been instituted, with votes allocated on
the basis of population. 272
The resolutions adopted in the two Connecticut regions were
weak. In the Capitol region, localities agreed to meet 25% of their
local shortfall of affordable housing over the next five years, except
Hartford which was to meet only 12.5%. Moreover, although they
were not permitted to exclude non-residents from the affordable
housing, they were permitted to grant preference to local residents. 7 3 Indeed,

the

Hartford

representative

conceded

this

approach from the beginning, saying "If each community would
take care of its own residents, Hartford's burden would be
74

eased."2

The compact was, nonetheless, relatively effective at cre-

ating housing. Four thousand fifty-five new housing opportunities
were created between July 1, 1989 and March 31, 1994, 86% of
which were created in Hartford's suburbs, and 75% of which were
available to low- and very low-income households.27 ' At the end of
268.

See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-386 (2003).

269.
270.

CONN. GEN. STAT.

271.

See LAWRENCE

See Connerly & Smith, supra note 145, at 91.
§ 8-386 (2003). See also Connerly & Smith, supra note 145, at 90.
SUSSKIND

& SUSAN L. PODZIBA, AFFORDABLE HOUSING MEDIATION 7

(1990).
272. Moreover, the consequences of a breakdown in negotiations were not clear. Thus,
it was in the central city's benefit to arrive at some agreement rather than none at all, while
this might have been less true for the suburban municipalities. See id. at 14. Nonetheless,
there was some fear that, if negotiations broke down, the state would intervene and impose
its own requirements. Connerly & Smith, supra note 145, at 90. There were further impetuses to reaching an agreement: professional negotiators were hired, see CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-386 (2003), and money was set aside for municipalities that were part of an agreed-upon
compact, see Connerly & Smith, supra note 145, at 91.
273. SUSSKIND & PODZIBA, supra note 271, at 8-9.
274. Id. at 7.
275. Connerly & Smith, supra note 145, at 92.
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five years, sixteen towns had achieved 75% or more of their minimum goals under the compact; five towns achieved between 5075% of their goals; and five towns achieved fewer than 50% of their
goals.27r The mere fact that the localities were involved in the proc-

ess of goal-setting seems to have caused at least some of them to
adopt the goal of fair housing as their own, to a greater extent than
might be the case if a fair housing requirement were imposed on
them 27from
the outside, despite the weakness of the initial agree7
ment.

Although the results of the Bridgeport negotiations were somewhat different, the tenor of the negotiations was similar. The
representative from Bridgeport did not possess a great deal of bargaining power.278 Moreover, four of the six participants in the
Bridgeport negotiations were overtly hostile to the creation of any
affordable housing in their localities, suggesting instead that all
affordable housing should be located in Bridgeport.2 79 Nonetheless, with little debate or consideration of alternative possible
solutions, the participants agreed on a fair share formula tied to
local population. 2 ° The formula allocated each municipality a
number of points equal to 10% of its population. The city or town
was required to reach the required number of points by either creating housing, modifying zoning ordinances, or engaging in a
variety of other pro-affordable housing actions.2

1

This end result

was better for Bridgeport than the Hartford solution (in which responsibility for creating housing was tied to local needs) would
have been. 2812 Moreover, municipalities were anxious to ensure that
their past efforts toward creating affordable housing were counted
toward their credit limit; this, too, proved favorable to Bridgeport.

Although no subsequent data is available for Bridgeport, Hartford's later experience is less than promising. After the initial fiveyear trial was over, the Capitol Region's towns, in a second round
of negotiations, voted to replace the prior compact's specific goals
276. Tondro, supra note 125, at 136.
277. Cf id. at 115-36 (describing Connecticut's lack of success with its state-imposed
appeals statute).
278. SUSSKIND & PODZIBA, supranote 271, at 33.
279. See id. at 28-29.
280. Id. at 30. The Bridgeport negotiations were attended solely by political figures; no
planners were present. If housing experts had been included in the negotiations, it is possible that a formula more closely tied with regional need would have been developed. Id. at
32-33.
281. Id. at 30.
282. SUSSKIND & PODZIBA, supranote 271, at 32.
283. Id. at 32-33.
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with a new five-year Regional Housing Policy. The new policy is
much less specific, and more standards-oriented, than the original
compact. It presents eleven strategies for the creation of a broad
range of housing; only one strategy addresses land use policy. The
others refer to transportation, job creation, use of governmental
subsidies, etc. In particular, the document fails to call for communities to ease entry barriers to affordable housing.284
The distinct difference in result between the first and second set
of negotiations is difficult to explain. One study demonstrates that
many local officials were dismayed when their good faith attempts
to create housing pursuant to the compact did not exempt them
28
from housing created under Connecticut's builder's remedy; 5
perhaps such sentiments led to communities wishing to weaken
their compact requirements (since they would be required to build
housing under the appeals statute in any event). At the same time,
some localities profess to have voluntarily created affordable housing only in response to the compact, and not in response to
pressure generated by Connecticut's appeals statute.286 The state of
the housing market was quite different in 1997, when the compact
was renewed, than it had been five years earlier; perhaps lower
housing prices made communities feel less of a need to create affordable housing, or other economic factors influenced their
change of heart.87 The compact certainly generated more good
will toward the creation of affordable housing than did the appeals
statute. 2881 Whatever the reason for the greatly weakened secondround agreement, it is clear that localities must feel empowered by
the compact process for it to be effective. Thus, failure to provide
for localities who were making good faith efforts toward meeting
their compact goals was likely a major factor in souring localities
on the prospect of a strong, effective compact.
3. Analysis-If the thesis of this Note is that a regional legislature representative of local interests should make the decisions
that most fundamentally affect the regional construction of housing, then California and Connecticut should serve as pristine
examples. Instead, they have fared worse than many of the other
approaches considered in this Note. The reason can be traced to
two factors: lack of democratic legitimacy (in the case of
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Tondro, supra note 125, at 136-37.
See Vodola, supra note 135, at 1267.
See id. at 1278.
See id. at 1283.
See id. at 1282.
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Connecticut), and lack of enforcement power (particularly in the
case of California).
The Connecticut pilot program, although promising in its emphasis on local negotiation, stacked the deck against the populous
central city by requiring unanimous voting rather than representation according to population. Thus, although a regional fairshare allocation was proposed in the Hartford area, the idea had
no chance of success.2 9 The only concession Hartford won was a
reduction in its required housing production, from 25% of its
shortfall to 12.5%.291 If any one of the suburban municipalities had
vetoed the compact, the only concrete consequence would have
been a return to the status quo-a situation clearly contrary to
Hartford's interest.2 2 Thus, Hartford was disadvantaged both by its
under-representation (possessing 12.8% of the population in the
region'1 2 but only 3.1% of the representatives in the negotiation, 94
and subject to veto by any of the other communities) and by the
background legal rules (a breakdown in negotiations would, at
least in the short term, be to Hartford's detriment).
By contrast, some regions in California do represent localities on
a one-person, one-vote basis.2 95 Where California primarily fails is in
enforcing the requirements set forth by the councils of governments. Additionally, the fact that California's councils of
governments have a limited jurisdiction means that a set of municipalities are always "losers"-they perennially have housing
"forced" on them, and have no bargaining chips because the only
issue on the table is housing. Moreover, the voluntary nature of
California's councils of governments prevents them from imposing
performance-based requirements. 29 6 A fuller comparison of Cali289.

See SUSSKIND & PODZIBA, supra note 271, at 11-12.
290. See id. at 16.
291.
Id. at 17. If it was subject to the 25% requirement, it would have produced 50% of
all new housing required by the compact. Id.
292. It is true that many local officials believed that the state would impose its own solution if negotiations broke down. See Michael Wheeler, Regional Consensus on Affordable
Housing: Yes in My Backyard? 12J. PLAN. EDUC. & RESEARCH 139, 142 (1993). However, Hartford was no more assured than any other municipality that the state-imposed solution would
be to its benefit.
293. See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS (in 1990, Hartford's
population was 139,739; the population of the metropolitan area was 1,085,895).
294. See SUSSKIND & PODZIBA, supra note 271, at 6 (twenty-nine communities were in attendance, plus three state agencies).
295. In particular, the councils of governments representing the Los Angeles and San
Diego areas possess proportional voting schemes. See infra Part III.C.
296. That is, there is no mechanism by which California's councils of governments may
require that a certain number of affordable units be built. All they may do is require that
localities zone for affordable housing, in the hope that private developers will take advantage of the opportunity to create the housing.
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fornia's approach will be deferred until after this Note's proposal is
set forth in more detail.297
Enforcement proved problematic in Connecticut as well. In the
first Hartford compact, localities were enthusiastic about creating
the agreed-to affordable housing, but few actually met their goals.
Many of the localities that did meet their goals did so only because
of the Connecticut appeals statute."8 Under the second compact,
there were hardly any standards that could be enforced. Neither of
consequences if lothe two compacts, nor state law, provided any
299
calities failed to conform to their agreement.
Despite their shortcomings, the benefits of California's and
Connecticut's emphasis on giving localities influence in their affordable housing creation are evident when compared to the
contrasting approaches studied thus far. In Massachusetts, localities
who have not reached the 10% threshold have, effectively, no control over the affordable housing created within their boundaries. If
a developer wishes to create a project, it is difficult for the municipality to intervene. In New Jersey and Oregon (in the Portland
area), municipalities may plan for affordable housing to a greater
extent, but the amount of housing they are to create is dictated by
the state, with no possibility for bargaining. This lack of control
negatively impacts the extent to which localities can be expected to
embrace the affordable housing ideal. The shortcomings inherent
in a state-centric approach are summarized by the comments of
one Connecticut official regarding the compact, quoted in PeterJ.
Vodola's study:
Although it was a regional compact, it was clear right from the
start that it was voluntary and was not being shoved down
people's throats.... In New England, where you have the
classic home rule system, it's always more successful to use a
cooperative manner than an edict manner. That's where the
hair goes up on the back and people say, 'Wait a minute-we
know what's best for our town.'""0

297. See infra Part III.C.
298. See Vodola, supra note 135, at 1267-68.
299. Cf SUSSKIND & PODZIBA, supra note 271, at 10 (each municipality was "accountable" to the others, but there is no indication that the meaning of this accountability was
spelled out).
300. Telephone interview by PeterJ. Vodola with Kenith Leslie, Town Planner, Town of
Glastonbury, quoted in Vodola, supra note 135, at 1281.
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Another Connecticut town official noted, "I'm sure all the municipalities would rather construct affordable housing at their own
pace rather than having Big Brother watching, ready to bash you
on the head if you don't conform."30'
Centralized planning both on a regional level (as in California
and Connecticut) and on a state-wide level (as in New Jersey and
Oregon) is more respectful of local autonomy than any implementation of an appeals statute. This is so primarily because, under a
centralized planning regime, site-specific decisions are generally
still reserved for the local community. The locality is typically required to submit a plan for approval by the central agency, and
then conform its zoning ordinances to the plan. This process
nonetheless leaves leeway as to the site of the required affordable
housing. By contrast, in an appeals statute regime, a municipality
that has not yet reached its quota may have its zoning ordinance
overridden by a developer, even though it has zoned for affordable
housing. Centralized planning allows for a rational planning process and local autonomy while ensuring that housing is truly
created.
There are important practical reasons for which communities
must be involved in the creation of their local affordable housing.
Some of these have already been noted. For instance, if a goal of
the housing program is to encourage urban minorities to move to
the suburbs, the suburbs will need to be seen as welcoming and
inviting. Furthermore, if communities are involved in the affordable housing process, they are more apt to follow the spirit of the
law.30 2 Resistance on the state level should also dissipate, eliminating the constant struggle, as in Massachusetts, to preserve the law's
continued existence.
The Connecticut compact, and California's system of councils of
government, have the right idea. If representation were proportionate to population, and if voting were by majority rather than by
consensus, and if the decisions of the regional entity could be reliably and effectively enforced, democratic participation in the
negotiations could take root. Coalitions across central city and inner suburbs could be built. Interest groups could be amassed
301. Telephone interview by PeterJ. Vodola with Kimberly Ricci, Town Planner, Town of
Rocky Hill, quoted in Vodola, supra note 135, at 1282.
302. For example, they are less likely to engage in tactics such as zoning their multifamily housing in areas "totally surrounded by industrially zoned land, virtually isolated from
residential uses, [with] no present access to other parts of the community, no water or sewer
connections nearby, . . . in the path of a proposed high speed railroad line, and ... subject
to possible flooding," Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 462, or seizing by eminent domain land for
which an affordable housing project has been proposed, see Tondro, supranote 125, at 159.
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throughout a region.3 What is important to note is that the concept of inter-municipality negotiation is not fundamentally at fault;
what is to be blamed is the structure in which the negotiations have
heretofore taken place. One may achieve the equivalent of
Rusk's-or of Montgomery County's-metropolitan government
without losing the local democratic benefits inherent in relatively
autonomous municipalities.
C. Appeals Statutes ProvideEffective Enforcement Mechanisms
While California and Connecticut produced regimes that were
acceptable to localities, the goals were poorly enforced. In developing a more effective framework, close attention should be paid to
the particularly efficient Massachusetts model. Despite its shortcomings, the Massachusetts appeals statute demonstrates that
where there is a determined developer and a municipality with less
than its fair share of affordable housing, the developer will likely
get affordable housing built.
The effectiveness of the Massachusetts model is traceable to two
attributes: the ease with which local zoning ordinances may be
challenged and the relative certainty attending the rules by which
challenges are judged. The statute creates a fast-track system for
affordable housing developers to get the required permits and
traverse the appeals process, and makes it clear when an appeal
will or will not be successful. These qualities are, in the main,
shared by New Jersey's approach, where specific rules promulgated
by COAH make it evident whether a municipality's ordinances are
or are not compliant, and where the builder's remedy remains the
ultimate stick to encourage compliance.
The lessons of this Part, taken as a whole, show that the appeals
statute approach in conjunction with a centralized planning approach is more promising than either standing alone. State-centric
planning, as in Oregon, is too disrespectful of local autonomy. Regional planning as in Connecticut's compact system and California
is too unenforceable. Straight appeals statutes are too intrusive.
Instead, low-cost, private administrative enforcement is vital, as in

303. The idea here would be that an interest group that is a minority in every municipality could add its numbers throughout the region and have a voice in negotiations
proportionate to their numbers in the region.
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NewJersey and Massachusetts. Local representation is needed, as
in Connecticut and California. Legislative bodies with proportional
representation, rather than technocratic state entities, should
make policy decisions. Moreover, the adjudicative body must not
be the state or some quasi-neutral body; otherwise the benefits of
autonomy are lost. Instead, the forum in which complaints of the
failure of a locality to adhere to agreed-upon housing goals may be
heard must be the same forum where those same goals are agreed
upon. This is the basic structure of this Note's proposal.

III.

THE REGIONAL HOUSING LEGISLATURE

A. Proposal

Following the lessons of Part II, this proposal combines the successful elements of the existing centralized planning and appeals

statute regimes. At the same time, it adds an element of representative democracy mixed with respect for local autonomy. In broad
terms, this Note proposes the creation of a Regional Housing Legislature (RHL) composed of representatives from each of the
region's cities and towns, apportioned on a one-person, one-vote
model. The RHL would set regional housing policy and would issue certifications of compliance for municipalities in the region. In
that capacity, it would assume many, if not all, of the functions of
COAH in New Jersey. 5 In order to avoid the problem of nonenforcement faced by California, the RHL would supplant the
courts, acting as the tribunal to enforce its own mandates.306 An
appeals mechanism would be established as well; the RHL would
assume the function of the Massachusetts Zoning Board of Appeals. As it would be inefficient to require the RHL to hear all
cases arising under its mandates en banc, a lower tribunal would
304. Indeed, New Jersey's and Massachusetts' approaches share the particularly effective, but intrusive, builder's remedy.
305. It may, however, be useful to have a non-political "expert" agency arrive at fair
share numbers. See infra Part III.D.6.
306. Thus, the scheme quite self-consciously violates the separation of powers-as is
typical for administrative agencies. More precisely, it embraces "separation of functions" in
lieu of "separation of powers" by combining executive, legislative, and judicial powers in a
single entity, but in a limited functional scope (i.e., limited to those functions relevant io the
administration of affordable housing). See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powersand the FourthBranch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 577-78 (1984); see also
Christine A. Desan, The ConstitutionalCommitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1381 (1998).
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also be established. The combination of these elements will produce a democratically responsive body capable of arriving at a
effective yet minimally obtrusive substantive housing policy.
1.

Composition and Election-The RHL's representatives are

elected on a town-by-town basis. Each town may elect a number of
representatives determined by the town's population. 307 The members of the RHL may be elected from at-large districts, or under a
winner-takes-all system, or may be nominated directly by the town
council. 38 The vital features of the RHL are twofold. First, every
city and town in the region must feel as if its voice can be heard on
the RHL. 3°" The legitimacy of the RHL depends upon its decisions
being seen as consented to, in process if not in substance, by each
of the towns.310 Second, the body must be democratically representative. By granting the central city and inner-ring suburbs
combined voting power that can override the exurbs, despite the
greater number of exurbs in a given region, this prevalent form of
minority rule may be eliminated.
This proposal draws from Professor Gerald Frug's proposal for a
regional legislature. Professor Frug embraces a two-tier solution, 1
but rejects the notion that, in so doing, it is necessary to allocate
certain functions to the local government and others to the regional government.312 Instead, a regional legislature should be
13
created to effect a "confluence of local and regional interests.
The legislature is not a voluntary organization, but instead derives
its power from the state legislature.1 4 Yet it is structured so as to
minimize the affront to local autonomy. To accomplish this, Professor Frug's proposal adapts ideas from the European Union's
governing structure. Most relevant to the present Note, Professor
Frug recommends that important decisions in the regional legislature be passed by a "qualified majority."31 5 Three criteria must be
met in order for a qualified majority to be achieved: It must garner
307. Alternative ways to structure the RHL are explored infra Part III.D.1.
308. This choice is discussed more fully in Part III.D.2.
309. The identity of the town's representatives is thus of vital importance. See infra Part
III.D.1.
310. That is, even if a town opposes a particular regulation each town should have a
vested interest in the efficacy of the RHL. That town should support the regulation to preserve its own ability to influence housing policy for the region.
311. I.e., retaining local governments and adding a regional government as opposed to
simply consolidating local governments into a single regional entity.
312. Frug, supra note 15, at 1788.
313. Id.at 1790.
314. Id.at 1792.
315. Id. at 1798-99.
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a minimum number of votes; the votes must represent a minimum
percentage of the regional population; and a minimum number of
jurisdictions must support the measure. While it is not clear that
the third requirement would be constitutional in the context of a
general government in the United States,1s 7 it may be feasible in
the case of a limited-jurisdiction housing legislature. Professor
Frug also suggests that the smallest town may be allocated one legislator, and other, larger towns be given a number of legislators
proportional to their population as compared to the smallest
town:" Alternatively, each city or town could have one representative, whose vote
would
be weighted according to his or her
,
•
319
jurisdiction's population.
In the RHL, as in Professor Frug's regional legislature, the representatives speak on behalf of their towns (or districts, see infra
Part III.D.2.). Unlike the New Jersey model, the members comprising the RHL do not purport to act in the general interest of the
region. It is hoped that the aggregate of their votes will approximate
the general regional welfare-but it is not necessary that the RHL
arrive at the "best" solution. It may be that only a disinterested state
agency may discover the right answer from a utilitarian perspective.
More important in the RHL is the inclusive process by which the
answers are sought. Where neither city nor suburb are excluded
from the decision-making process, any solution is more likely to be
accepted, and legitimated, by the regional populace than a "good"
solution imposed by a benevolent state agency.
The importance of proportional voting according to the oneperson, one-vote standard cannot be overemphasized. First, the
principle may be constitutionally required. 20 Second, there is little
point in convening a regional housing legislature if the exurbs can
simply outvote the central city. Yet, outside of California 3 2 ' none of
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1800.
318. Id. at 1801.
319. Id. at 1802.
320. Legislatures with general governmental powers must be apportioned according to
one-person, one-vote. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575-76 (1964). However, given the
RHL's limited scope of powers, the constitutional requirement may not be applicable to it.
See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 (1973).
But see, e.g., Hadley v.Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1970). On
the other hand, members of the RHL are envisioned to have broad authority to make compromises on issues that go beyond housing policy; this authority might make the RHL more
like a general government. See infra Part II.D.1. At any rate, regardless of constitutional
requirements, it is a crucial aspect of this proposal that the RHL be apportioned on a oneperson, one-vote basis.
321. SCAG and SANDAG have proportional and weighted voting, respectively. See infra
Part I1I.C.
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the proposals studied thus far in this Note are founded on a oneperson, one-vote system. Centralized planning systems such as New
Jersey's operate on the assumption that housing policy is purely a
technical issue, i.e., no one gets to vote. The Connecticut compact
system permitted any town a veto, disadvantaging the central city
when compared to a proportional voting scheme. 22
The RHL's commitment to affordable housing without marginalizing the residents of the wealthier suburbs is guaranteed under
this proposal by its proportional representation combined with its
broadly-defined jurisdiction. To understand this point, it is useful
to refer to the four types of municipalities identified by Myron Orfield: central cities, at-risk developed suburbs; developing
communities; and affluent job centers."' According to Orfield, the
central cities combined with the developed suburbs, the two types
of municipalities most interested in affordable housing,' together
constitute 44% of the population in the most populous metropolitan areas. 5 This is a sizeable voting bloc, but not quite a majority.
Moreover, this coalition is not ironclad; there will be times, perhaps due to differences in political parties or ideologies, when
inner suburbs may not agree with each other or with the inner city.
These factors render it crucial to gather support from the developing suburbs- municipalities who are more interested in issues such
as equity in school funding, infrastructure, and sprawl.2 6 Potentially, job centers might join the coalition, if their interests
alleviating congestion and preserving open space, or improving
the economic health of the region, and thus strengthening the
workforce, may be met.32 y An RHL which permits bargaining for
these other goods in exchange for housing concessions empowers
those municipalities most concerned with a shortage of affordable
housing to achieve their housing goals.
Despite the political give-and-take, and the presence of other issues on the table, the focus of the RHL on housing issues, and the
sizeable voting bloc of jurisdictions interested in improving the
housing situation will inexorably require that all municipalities
create their fair share of affordable housing. There will be some
flexibility-a town may successfully argue, for instance, that it is not
in their regional interest for it to accept its housing fair share,
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See infra Part III.D.3.
SeeORIELD, supra note 31, at 162-72.

See id. at 164-67.
Id. at 162.
See id. at 168-71.
See id. at 171-72.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 37:2

perhaps because of a town's inaccessibility to jobs, or a particular
natural resource that development would impair. But in this rare
situation, the RHL would likely demand other concessions from
the municipality, such as monetary contributions or transit improvements. Indeed, it is not only the central city and inner
suburbs who will enforce the fair share requirement on the outer
suburbs. Outer suburbs themselves, in self-interest, will enforce the
requirement on other outer suburbs. This self-policing will take
place because suburbs concerned with the maintenance of their
property values will be interested in ensuring that their neighbors
create at least as much affordable housing as they themselves are
required to create.32 s
2. Functions-To concretize this proposal, this Note examines
more specifically the duties and functions of the RHL. These may
be divided into three categories: the RHL's preliminary responsibilities; its day-to-day legislative functions; and its adjudicative and
enforcement activities.
a. Preliminary:Setting methodology-The RHL's first task would be

to arrive at criteria by which affordable housing is to be distributed
throughout the region. This is a fundamentally political taskindeed, it is the fundamental purpose of the RHL. It is expected
that some form of fair share arrangement will be arrived at,330 but

details will vary according to the localities' preferences. For instance, a central city with a large amount of affordable housing
may agree to take on more than its fair share of housing in exchange, for instance, for promises by other towns to support
funding for a reverse commuting public transportation program. 331
Alternatively, it is possible that the RHL will abandon a fair share
model entirely and focus its resources on reinvesting in the central
3
city. 2
The importance of the determination of the methodology required to ascertain housing allotments in each municipality is
underscored by the attention given this subject by many of the
328. See infra Part III.D.10.
329. Thus, unlike the arguably ministerial task of collecting data and arriving at specific
fair share allocations per municipality, this task cannot be delegated to an administrative
agency. See infra Part III.D.6. Arguably, this authority might be imputed to the RHL itself;
thus, the RHL begins to look more like a general legislature and less like an agency.
330. Indeed, in creating the RHL, the state legislature should probably make absolute
fair share apportionment the background rule. See infra Part III.D.3.
331. There is the danger here of repeating the mistake of NewJersey's regional contribution agreements. See infra Part III.D.4. Note also that the RHL representatives must be
authorized to commit the town on more issues than simply land use planning. See infra Part
III.D.1.
332. See infra Part III.D.4.

WINTER

2004]

Democratizingthe American Dream

states studied in this Note. California's statute requires regional
councils of governments to provide each city and county with the
methodology used 3 33 Florida's statute requires municipalities who
do not use the state's fair share numbers to at least use its prescribed methodology in arriving at fair share amounts. 3 4 In New
Jersey, COAH itself ascertains a level of regional housing need, and
adopts "criteria" by which municipalities are to determine their
own fair share of the regional need.35 In each of these states, an
administrative agency reserves to itself the policy task of determining the mechanism by which fair share determinations are to be
made.
This allocation of responsibility is misguided. The important decision about the proper methodology to use must be made by a
politically responsive legislative body, not by an insulated technocratic agency. Methodology is a political decision. For instance, one
must decide whether the goal will be to meet the projected housing need four years down the line, or fifteen years. One must
decide which population's needs are counted; for instance, is the
projected need for luxury housing to be counted or not?33 6 Unaccountable state agencies are ill-suited to make these policy
decisions.
This is not to argue that the RHL will not also need an unbiased
agency to conduct highly technical tasks. s ' But on the policy aspects of the methodology, the RHL must have the final word.
b. Day-To-Day: Certification; Considering New Strategies; Adjusting
Goals and Methodology; Reporting-The RHL's legislative task is not

complete when it arrives at a fair share methodology. It must meet
regularly to perform a number of functions. Its most frequent task

333. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 65584(a) (2003).
334. See FIA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(6)(f)(2) (West 2003).
335. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307(c) (1) (West 2003). But if the municipality seeks
to have its housing element certified by COAH, then the municipality's determination of its
fair share is subject to review by COAH. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-314(a) (West 2003).
336. Even this decision has a mixed technical and policy component. The creation of
luxury housing has a salutary effect on the availability of low-income housing, through the
operation of "filtering." See, e.g., WALLACE F. SMITH, FILTERING AND NEIGHBORHOOD
CHANGE 17-33 (1964). Obviously, the creation of low-income housing has a more direct
effect, but this generally requires governmental subsidies. SeeJanet Stearns, The oio-Income
Housing Tax Credit: A Poor Solution to the Housing Crisis,
6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 203, 206-07
(1988). The creation of moderate-income housing may not require subsidies and may still
have a more direct positive effect on the availability of low-income housing. An expert
agency could advise the RHL of these possibilities; but the final choice should be left to the
legislature.
337. This requirement is explored more fully infra Part III.D.6.
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will be the certification of municipal housing elements.5 3 In New
Jersey, the certification process is voluntary; if a municipality fails
to have its comprehensive plan certified, a plaintiff asserting in
court that a municipality engages in exclusionary zoning merely
has a lower burden of proof.33 9 This solution befits the RHL as well.
Indeed, unlike in New Jersey, whether the RHL is called upon in
advance to certify a municipality's comprehensive plan, or ex post to
ascertain whether the municipality engages in exclusionary zoning,
the same body will review the land use ordinances. Municipalities
may choose to not have their ordinances scrutinized by the RHL,5 4
but the lure of the builder's remedy will guarantee that, where it
makes economic sense to build affordable housing, developers will
bring suit; the municipality's housing policy will nonetheless be
reviewed by the RHL.
Under this proposal, as in NewJersey, there is an opportunity for
regional residents to challenge a municipality's certification. However, unlike in New Jersey, this proposal presents certification as a
legislative, not quasi-judicial, task. Challengers' interests are represented, not by procedural process, but by democratic
representation. They are relegated to lobbying and letter-writing;
they are not guaranteed a hearing. The reason is that the certification process again represents an opportunity for negotiation in the
RHL. Should the legislature desire to modify its pre-announced
rules in order to accommodate special circumstances in a municipality (or to make a deal with a municipality), it can do so in the
341
context of a certification decision . If the RHL does change or
338. There is no necessary requirement that municipalities enact comprehensive plans
with housing elements. The RHL may review a locality's zoning ordinances, viewed as a
whole, for compliance with RHL policy. Of course, the RHL's task is simplified if localities
do enact comprehensive plans with housing elements; and the RHL may choose to impose
such a requirement on localities.
339. SeeN.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-317(a) (West 2003).
340. They may, for instance, feel strongly that home rule entitles them to control land
use in the way they see fit. Or, they may feel no need to go through the process of certification if they are confident that their ordinance would pass muster.
341. Unlike under the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which provides for
two types of administrative lawmaking (rulemaking and adjudications, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 553,
554 (2000)), in the RHL there are three opportunities for lawmaking. First, most rules of
general applicability will be set forth during regular legislative sessions. Second, the RHL
provides for certification deliberations, which are analogous to licensing under the APAforward-looking, like a rule, but dealing with facts applicable to an individual, like an adjudication. In the RHL, adjudicatory procedures could be used in the context of deciding
whether or not to certify a municipality's housing element. But the RHL would retain full
flexibility to engage in common law precedent-setting during certification proceedings-i.e.,
it is fully permissible for the RHL to arrive at new rules if a novel issue arises during certification proceedings. Cf SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947) (approving the
SEC's creation of a new rule in the context of an adjudication). However, during an appeal
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waive the preexisting rules, however, it will be required to make the
change explicit and public, so that it may serve as a precedent for
the future. Because the RHL retains flexibility in the certification
process, municipalities are further encouraged to undergo this
process rather than risk a builder's remedy lawsuit later.34
Thus far, this proposal has relied on developers to actually create housing. In the absence of governmental subsidies, it is unlikely
that developers will create low-income housing. 4 s They may create
moderate-income housing, which may or may not be beneficial to
low-income individuals as the previous housing occupied by moderate-income
individuals filters down into the low-income
3
market. "

Moreover, merely adjusting land-use regulations may not provide sufficient market incentive for developers to produce
sufficient low- or moderate-income housing to satisfy the needs of
the region. This is exactly the situation faced by California.3

45

It is

therefore crucial that the RHL retain a wide range of flexibility.
For instance, the RHL may be given jurisdiction over the state's
public housing budget. In this case, the RHL could apportion the
budget across the towns as appropriate, and require that public
housing be built in some uniform manner across the state. Or, the
RHL could require that localities adopt any of the panoply of in346
clusionary
Montgomery
Maryland, sozoning
that, to ordinances,
the extent that as
any in
development
occursCounty,
in the

from a local zoning decision, particularly those involving a municipality whose housing element has been certified, the RHL will be much more limited in its ability to promulgate new
rules. Formally, this might be accomplished through an application of res judicata, under
the theory that, once the RHL has certified a municipality's housing element, it may not
change its mind absent new evidence. Or it may simply be that stare decisis is given more
weight during appeals (which are more "purely" adjudications) than it is during certification
proceedings (which are forward-looking, and therefore have some of the qualities of rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4) (2000) (including having "future effect" as one characteristic
of a "rule")).
342. From a policy perspective, the certification process is better than the appeals process. Challenging a municipality's land use ordinance through an appeal to the RHL will
incur significant transaction costs. This will change the calculus for developers (making it
less likely that it will be worthwhile to build the project), and will often make it impossible
for low-income individuals to mount a successful challenge. Moreover, certification leads to
a greater amount of certainty than ex post challenges.
343. See, e.g., Stearns, supra note 336, at 206-07.
344. The creation of more moderate-income housing will decrease the cost of such
housing, presumably allowing low-income individuals to move into some of the older housing. See SMITH, supra note 336, at 17-33. But see CHARLES L. LEVEN ET AL., NEIGHBORHOOD
CHANGE: LESSONS IN THE DYNAMICS OF URBAN DECAY 37-47 (1976).
345. See LEWIS, supranote 254, at 68-69.
346. For example, permissive or compulsory set-asides.

University ofMichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 37:2

cities and towns, affordable housing is also built. The RHL may
simply require municipalities to create housing, after a realistic assessment of their ability to do so. Alternatively, the RHL could
abandon supply-side production entirely, and simply tax its members, using the resulting revenue to issue vouchers to low-income
individuals.
If the RHL undertakes to require affirmative steps of its municipalities, its flexibility-and that of the localities-is greatly
enhanced. Affirmative steps may be defined broadly, and may include: conversion of market-rate housing to affordable rates;
subsidies to poor families to enable them to afford market-rate
housing; and traditional inclusionary zoning actions. Indeed, if
affirmative steps were required, localities' zoning ordinances become irrelevant. The RHL might choose to entirely eliminate
certification of zoning ordinances in favor of simply certifying a
municipality based on whether or not it created the requisite
amount of housing. 47
Certifications will likely expire every few years; municipalities
wishing to retain their certification will be required to present a
new showing before the RHL. Because populations shift and housing needs change, fair share numbers will need to be constantly
reevaluated and reformulated, and housing elements will need to
be revised based on the new numbers. Moreover, in cases where
the RHL requires affirmative steps on the part of the municipalities, the recertification process will involve a review of whether the
municipalities have adhered to their obligations.
In addition to its certification task, the RHL would be responsible for constantly monitoring the success of its programs. On a
regular basis, the RHL (or an administrative agency under the
RHL's direction) would reassess housing need and progress toward
housing goals. This assessment would have both an enforcement
purpose 34s and a legislative purpose. The RHL would be required
to revise its methodology or specific municipal goals where necessary, such as when it becomes obvious that a town's goal is too
burdensome as compared to the benefits to regional residents. 49 In
such a circumstance, the RHL might decrease the town's goal in
347. See discussion of San Diego infra Part III.C.
348. See infra Part III.A.2.c.
349. Any unit of housing built will theoretically provide more housing to the region.
But if the community in question is particularly remote, with no public transportation access
and fewjobs, then building significant amounts of affordable housing in such a community
seems relatively pointless. In some circumstances, this may become obvious only after some
period of time passes, for instance, if affordable housing is built but the only families who
move in are from the local area.
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exchange for an increased commitment to public transportation
within the town, or possibly in exchange for monetary contributions. 35°
Finally, the RHL would be required to report regularly on the
regional affordable housing situation. This requirement ensures
that the RHL remains responsive to its constituents. RHL elections
should not be like elections for the county register of probate,
where the voter either votes on party lines, randomly, or not at all.
Affordable housing is an issue that galvanizes many segments of
the population, but popular participation cannot be ensured if the
populace is not kept informed. In addition to (and perhaps
spurred by) the regular reporting of the RHL, individual representatives should keep their constituents updated on their activities. A
high degree of community education and involvement is particularly important given that the RHL's main constituency is the poor,
a group that traditionally exhibits low degrees of voter turnout.
The RHL's representatives must make an extra effort to educate
their underprivileged constituents to ensure their participation in
RHL politics, thereby preventing the RHL from losing sight of
those it is charged to help.
In the wealthier suburbs, constant communication about the activities of the RHL is vital to dissipate distrust of the legislature. If
constituents are kept informed that neighboring communities are
satisfying their affordable housing requirements, the constituents
will be less likely to resist when it comes time for housing to be
built in their neighborhoods.
c. Enforcement: The RHL as Tribunal-As noted earlier, the RHL

will also act as a tribunal to review allegations that a given municipality is engaging in exclusionary zoning or otherwise failing to
abide by requirements of the RHL. Under this proposal (as in New
Jersey), either developers or private individuals may challenge a
zoning ordinance, though the mechanism differs for each.
Any resident of the region has standing to present a facial challenge to a municipality's zoning ordinances. In such an ex post
challenge, unlike during certification proceedings, the individual
has rights appurtenant to Anglo-American judicial proceedings,
e.g., the right to present evidence and call witnesses. Moreover, the
RHL is to be bound by its promulgated regulations; it may not
change the rules in the middle of the game. An individual challenging the land use policy of a municipality whose comprehensive
350.

See infra Part III.D.4.
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plan has been certified will face an increased burden of proof. The
plaintiff may show that the comprehensive plan as certified is not
actually in effect, perhaps due to lack of enforcement or large
numbers of granted zoning variances that swallow the rule. A
plaintiff may also attempt to show that a previous decision to certify
a comprehensive plan was "clearly erroneous," in that the comprehensive plan does not comport with regulations promulgated by
the RHL, and there was no explicit waiver by the RHLL.

3

5'

Finally, a

plaintiff might argue that a given zoning ordinance does not comport with the certified comprehensive plan.
An individual plaintiff challenging a zoning ordinance or comprehensive plan of a municipality that has not sought certification
would have an easier task. In such a situation, the RHL need
merely ascertain whether the ordinance in question, or alternatively the locality's ordinance taken as a whole, "substantially
impairs" compliance with the municipality's fair share allotment of
affordable housing.
In either case, an individual plaintiff begins by presenting his or
her argument to the local zoning board, taking advantage of whatever local procedures are available to do so. If no favorable
response is forthcoming from the board, the plaintiff institutes an
action in an Appeals Tribunal, which is a subset of the full RHL. 52
Failure to present an argument to the town first, however, where an
opportunity was available, and where it would not have been futile
to do so, would result in waiver of the argument.
The path a developer must take to challenge a zoning ordinance, either on its face or as applied to a given proposed
development, tracks the Massachusetts appeals statute. First, the
developer presents a comprehensive permit application to a local
zoning board. The local zoning board may allow the development,
disallow the development, or allow it with conditions. If it is disallowed or allowed with conditions, the developer will have the right
to appeal the decision to the Appeals Tribunal. From here, the
situation is much the same as in the individual suit, with the burden of proof varying depending on whether or not the
municipality has been certified.
A public entity, akin to a special state prosecutor, may also bring
an enforcement action. This procedure need only apply where the
351. This will be quite difficult, since the same body established the certification in the
first place. The test should probably not be phrased as "arbitrary and capricious," as under
the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1996); the RHL would never call
its own acts arbitrary and capricious.
352. See infra Part III.D.5.

WINT ER

20041

Democratizingthe American Dream

RHL has issued an affirmative mandate for municipalities to create
housing. An administrative enforcement might have authority to
fine a noncompliant municipality, and, with the funds collected,
create the required amount of housing on its own. The adjudication would take place before the RHL, beginning at the appellate
level. Thus, the municipality will be judged effectively by a jury of
its peers, and the resolution should be legitimated as a result of
this practice.
B. Benefits

1. Effectiveness-The effectiveness of this proposal depends on a
few factors: first, the accuracy of the RHL's assessment of regional
need; second, the extent to which suburban representatives, and in
particular panel members, internalize the need to build affordable
housing in the suburbs; third, the degree to which local boards internalize the need to build the housing; and fourth the degree to
which a central-city/inner-suburb coalition within the RHL is able
to enforce the background goal of sufficient and diffuse affordable
housing.
With respect to the determination of regional need for affordable housing, it is important that the RHL arrive at a methodology,
and fair share numbers, that are generally accepted as reasonable.
A heuristic, such as Massachusetts' exemption for towns at least
10% of whose housing stock is affordable, is unlikely to be acceptable because it is too imprecise, and will undoubtedly be unfair in
specific instances. The best solution is to employ the services of a
disinterested expert agency in an advisory capacity, as discussed
infra, Part III.D.6.
With respect to the second requirement for effectiveness, it is
expected that, under this proposal, suburban representatives will
fully internalize the need to create affordable housing in the suburbs. In other words, suburbs will be "decentered"3

54

to some

extent, viewing their interests as intertwined with those of the region. First, from a purely practical perspective, suburbs will come
353. Theoretically, a municipality could be "prosecuted" for failing to provide for sufficient affordable housing in its comprehensive plan. However, this would be a waste of
resources, since the only remedy would be a conforming comprehensive plan. The builder's
remedy in this situation serves the same function, by effectively invalidating the municipality's plan where a developer shows interest in creating affordable housing.
354. See Frug, supra note 62.
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to understand that their failure to engage in good-faith negotiations regarding the facilitation of the creation of low-income
housing will result in a decrease in their bargaining power in the
RHL, the end result being their ultimate disempowerment. Moreover, from a self-interested perspective, suburban representatives
will want to ensure that other suburbs need to bear an equal burden.35' Second, the simple fact that the representatives meet on a
regular basis and discuss affordable housing concerns is likely to
raise awareness in the representatives. The proportional representation, and the resulting shift in the balance of power, is also likely
to affect the representatives' thinking.
Local zoning boards will likewise internalize a regional consciousness as a result. As a practical matter, the zoning boards will
act according to the dictates of the RHL because they will be reversed if they do not. More to the point, however, where towns feel
they are a part of the affordable housing planning process, they are
more likely to accept the requirements that they themselves helped
devise. This is discussed more fully in the next sub-section.
Finally, the central-city/inner-suburb coalition 356 is essential to
the success of this plan. That does not mean that the central city
and inner suburbs must always be on the same side. Indeed, they
ought not to be.35" But generally speaking, the drive to create an
adequate amount of affordable housing throughout the region will
come from the central city and inner suburbs.
Thus, this proposal cures Connecticut's unambitious goal-setting
by ensuring a meaningful voice for the central city and inner suburbs through proportional representation. It cures California's substandard enforcement by substituting an appeals statute regime for
enforcement. The promise for improvement over New Jersey's experience lies in this proposal's emphasis on local autonomy by
getting communities involved in the decision-making process.
2. Democratic Legitimacy-Two questions come into play when

considering the extent to which this proposal adequately addresses
democratic concerns. First, does the proposal advance local de355. To the extent that fear of falling property values is a driving concern for resisting
affordable housing, suburbs will be interested in ensuring that the burden is equally spread.
If there is affordable housing everywhere, then property values will not be affected. See infta
Part III.D.10.
356. See ORFIELD, supra note 323, at 162-72.
357. Otherwise this solution is no different from a straightforward regional legislature
in which the minority outer suburbs have no voice. It is expected that the inner suburbs will
have some interests in common with the outer suburbs, and some in common with the central city. The central city will likewise have some interests in common with the outer suburbs.
Cf THIE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (arguing that, in a large enough republic,
majority factions will not form because there will be too wide a variety of interests).
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mocracy by empowering local governments? Second, does the proposal empower the residents of the region as a whole?
The proposal is designed so that the answer to both questions is
yes. Local governments are empowered by giving them a seat at the
bargaining table at which affordable housing decisions are made.
It is true the "balance of autonomies" is shifted. Under current local government law, the central city has little autonomy, since
externalities imposed upon it by the actions of the suburbs are beyond its control. 9 Outer suburbs have a larger degree of
autonomy. Here, the degree of autonomy is allocated according to
population: a larger town has a greater say in its own future, and by
extension, the future of the region. However, residents of outer
suburbs are by no means disenfranchised. They continue to have
the right to provide for planning within their jurisdiction, provided
that the plans comport with requirements of the RHL. They retain
the right to form coalitions within the RHL to modify its rules.
Power is shifted, but only to the extent that it is allocated in a more
democratic manner.
Moreover, unlike most of the approaches reviewed in this Note,
those citizens most directly affected by the affordable housing will
have a democratically elected voice with which to air their concerns. Housing policies enacted by the RHL will have a degree of
moral force absent from court pronouncements or administrative
agency regulations. In enacting pro-affordable housing policies,
the RHL can legitimately claim to be acting pursuant to a democratic mandate. This difference is key in reducing the extent to
which exurbs will be able to invoke democratic values in positing
reasons for resisting affordable housing mandates.360

C. CaliforniaRevisited

At this point, a more in-depth analysis of the regime in place in
southern California is warranted. The foregoing proposal is in
many ways quite analogous to the solution employed in California
358. This statement assumes that the representatives to the RHL represent governments, notjust their constituents. This is further explored infra Part III.D.1.
359. See David Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DuiE LJ. 377, 401
(2001).
360. Outer suburbs may still argue that affordable housing is the city's problem, not
theirs. Even this argument is rendered somewhat hollow by the regional nature of the RHL.
It is, after all, not the city's problem, but the region's problem, of which the outer suburbs
are a part.
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for the past three decades. Unfortunately, the California approach
361
has been widely criticized. Indeed, a recent study found that municipalities whose housing elements were found to be compliant
produced the same amount of housing as non-compliant municipalities. 62 Nonetheless, the California regime has many promising
features, not the least of which is the potential for regional bodies
with voting powers weighted in a democratic manner. This proposal has attempted to overcome the shortcomings of the southern
California approach while retaining its uniquely democratic aspect.
Two of California's councils of governments have voting authority allocated according to population: the Southern California
Association of Governments (SCAG) and the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG)363 SCAG's governing body
consists of a 70-member board; one member is elected for every
200,000 residents. 64 Thus, all fifteen members of the Los Angeles
city council are members of SCAG, while smaller towns are required to elect a single representative to represent all of them.363
Representatives are chosen by, and sit on, the city councils. SCAG,
and the other councils of governments in California, establish a
methodology for determining housing need, determine regional
need (subject to state approval) and allocate fair share housing
numbers to their constituent municipalities. There is a process by
which municipalities' housing elements are certified, granting
them a presumption of validity in subsequent litigation. 366
This Note's proposal addresses the shortcomings inherent in the
California scheme. First, as has been widely noted, enforcement in
California is a major issue. 367 The primary enforcement "stick" in
California is the threat of a builder's remedy, which would be
heard in the state court system.3

s

By contrast, the RHL (or its sub-

sidiary appellate bodies) hears all matters concerning its own
regulations. The RHL may be expected to be much less deferential
to local legislatures than a court would be.363 Moreover, the present
361. See, e.g., Field, supra note 31.
362. See LEwIS, supra note 254, at 68-69.
363. Telephone Interview with Rusty Selix, Executive Director, California Association of
Councils of Government (April 10, 2003).
364. Id. Indeed, SCAG began with many fewer representatives; as the population of
Southern California grew, the size of the board grew as well. Id.
365. Id.
366. See supra Part II.B.1.
367. See, e.g., Field, supra note 31, at 46-68.
368. See supra Part II.B.1.
369. This may be particularly true in California, where the councils of governments are
merely voluntary organizations among municipalities, with no general legislative authority.
See LEWIS, supra note 254, at 26. The cities and towns themselves have city councils entrusted
with legislative powers. Cf Berenson, 341 N.E.2d at 243 ("Zoning... is essentially a legislative
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proposal provides for two mechanisms of enforcement beyond the
builder's remedy. An individual citizen may sue to have certification revoked. 7 Alternatively, an administrative agency may bring
an enforcement action against a municipality for failure to conform to affirmative requirements imposed by the RHL. Thus, the
threat of meaningful sanctions is present independent of developer participation.
Second, under this proposal, the state has no role in determining a region's fair share or in certifying municipalities. A
consistently contentious issue in California is how to allocate fair
share housing when most municipalities feel that the total pie
(mandated by the state) is too high. 7 ' If the RHL arrives at a measure of regional need on its own, it will be hard for noncompliant
municipalities to justify their failure to comply by arguing to their
fellow representative that the overall housing needs assessment is
too high. Similarly, in California, a state agency determines
whether municipalities have complied with the requirements of
their Council of Governments. Under this Note's proposal, the
RHL arrives at all certification decisions, as it is uniquely situated
to interpret its own regulations and apply them to municipalities.
Moreover, it is less of an affront to a municipality's local autonomy
to have its certification denied by a body in which it has a voice,
rather than by a state agency.
Third, the RHL, unlike the California COGs, is a mandatory organization. In California, the COGs have little leverage over
members, who join of their own free will. 72 The RHL will be a
art" and it entitled to deference). Courts are likely to view exercise of legislative power on
the part of the localities more generously action by the councils of governments, which have
no legislative authority.
370. In truth, this remedy still relies on the builder's remedy in the end. The citizen's
remedy is merely to have certification revoked; even if successful, a developer would still
need to attempt to build housing before there were any practical significance.
371. See LEWIS, supra note 254, at 26 ("The zero-sum quality of RHNA allocations puts
COGs, which are constituted as cooperative organizations of local governments, in a difficult
position. They are left to carry out a state mandate while still feeling pressure from their
local government members who feel that their housing allocations are excessive.").
372. See id. ("[State] officials have said that the COG is the level at which intraregional
disputes should be worked out, but given their weak political basis, most COGs have not
been able to take a strong, autonomous approach. 'Without independent authority, regional
agencies have little wherewithal to overcome fundamental conflicts between local and statewide interests ....
'Or, as a senior planner for the Association of Bay Area Governments put
it, 'from ABAG's perspective, the process has been a serious political liability for a voluntary
membership organization....'" (internal citations omitted)); see also Frug, supra note 15, at
1792 ("To be effective, a regional legislature would have to have the power to ensure that its
decisions, once made, will be followed by the region's cities and special purpose governments.").
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creature of state law, and membership will be mandatory. The RHL
will have the power to impose sanctions on non-cooperating municipalities.
Finally, the flexibility of the RHL, contrasted with the narrow
functions granted to California's councils of governments, should
help to ameliorate some of the stark power differentials inherent
in the California scheme. In California, a sizeable number of municipalities are likely to be perennial losers. California COGs do
not provide an opportunity to bargain for non-housing goods;
thus, exurbs may have affordable housing imposed on them with
no countervailing benefit for them .
By contrast, the RIL pro
vides a forum to bargain for other goods in exchange for housing.
For instance, exurbs may be able to work out a regional contribution agreement with more central cities. Alternatively, a town may
be convinced to create more affordable housing in exchange for
the central city's support for improved transit to that town. 374 The
RHL's authoritative jurisdiction is housing, but it should also provide the forum for other inter-municipal agreements, where those
agreements are made to further the RHL's general housing pol• y375
icy.~
An examination of the council of government approach in California is not complete without examining a relatively recent pilot
program in San Diego.376 Any municipality that is part of SANDAG
may choose to self-certify its housing element if it meets the following criteria: it must provide for the housing needs of individuals of
373. Telephone Interview with Rusty Selix, supra note 363. Bargaining in the opposite
direction, i.e., where the central city agrees to allow some of its affordable housing to count
toward suburbs' quotas, is the idea of regional contribution agreements. The California
statute does provide for a limited form of such agreements, permitting the transfer of housing allocations from a county to a city, presumably in exchange for compensation. See CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 65584(c)(5) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003)(providing for a reduction in a
county's share of regional housing need if one or more cities in the county increase their
shares to make up for the reduction).
374. For instance, the central city may sit on the governing board of the regional transportation agency. It may threaten to withhold its vote for improved service to a particular
municipality unless that municipality agrees to create its fair share of affordable housing. To
the extent that the city has few opportunities for leverage over its suburbs, state law might be
modified to allow the central city more of a say about other regional issues, for instance, by
increasing its representation on various special-purpose metropolitan area commissions.
375. Cf ORFIELD, supra note 31, at 162-72 (arguing that all suburbs benefit from regionalism, but that different types of suburbs have different interests). The RHL must be
flexible enough to provide some of the benefits of regionalism to suburbs who are not interested in affordable housing. Nonetheless, the RHL is not a regional government. Its limited
focus allows it, for example, to violate separation of powers without creating excessive worries of tyranny. Moreover, its narrow charter permits it to focus more clearly on the pressing
housing issues, getting sidetracked into other issues only when necessary to gain political
support for housing initiatives.
376. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65585.1 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
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all income levels; it must have been in compliance with its fair
share goals as of the due date for the third revision of its housing
element;3" and subsequently, it must have affirmatively created as
much low-income housing as possible, as determined by
SANDAG.37 s SANDAG, in conjunction with the municipalities and
an outside consultant, determines the maximum number of lowincome units each jurisdiction can create given the realistic constraints on its resources. 379 Thus, San Diego has adopted a resultsoriented approach; municipalities may self-certify if they have created (not just provided the possibility for creation) a certain
number of units, determined by SANDAG, for low-income (not
moderate-income) individuals. Self-certification is subject to challenge in court (presumably in the context of a builder's remedy
suit);
but the certification enjoys a rebuttable presumption of validss°
ity.
The San Diego proposal responds to two common criticisms of
California's affordable housing situation. First, as detailed by a recent report, simply providing for the creation of affordable
housing through zoning is often insufficient to actually cause the
housing to be created.38' Second, municipalities would clearly prefer to self-certify than to submit their housing elements for
approval by the state.
The RHL might adopt similarly affirmative results-based criteria.
However, the RHL's approach would be much more flexible. San
Diego's proposal required special state legislation, and the parameters of its pilot program are not easily expanded without returning
to the state for permission. By contrast, an RHL would have a degree of autonomy that cannot be achieved by voluntary councils of
governments created by inter-municipal compact. The RHL, as a
legislature, would have the authority to adopt San Diego's proposal
without returning to the state legislature for additional authority.
Furthermore, although the RHL would have the power to provide for self-certification, it seems unlikely that the RHL would
exercise that power. Certification by the RHL is already one step
closer to home than state certification, the default in California. It
seems unlikely that the RHL would be willing to allow its municipalities to simply certify compliance with RHL rules. Moreover,
377. California municipalities are required to periodically revise their housing elements. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65588(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
378. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65585.1(c) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
379. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65585.1 (a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
380. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65585.1 (d) (2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003).
381. See LEWIs, supra note 254, at 68-69.
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policing by municipalities of each other is particularly important in
the RHL context, since it is in each municipality's best interest to
ensure that everyone else is creating his or her fair share of housing. Such monitoring is greatly facilitated when the RHL is
provided the opportunity to examine its municipalities' housing
elements in the context of certification proceedings-an opportunity lost if towns are allowed to self-certify.
D. Issues and Concerns
Up to here, this Note presented a unitary vision of how a regional legislature devoted to the creation of affordable housing
might operate. This section explores further choices that must be
made, and setting forth potential consequences arising out of
those choices.
1. Choosing Town Representatives-The nature of the RHL in
many ways depends on the identity of the representatives. For instance, during the Connecticut compact negotiations, some
Connecticut towns sent their mayors, and others sent a town resident without authority to bind the town. 8 2 In Connecticut,
mediators attempted to ameliorate the situation by requiring that
representatives be addressed by first name with no title. Clearly,
this is a sub-optimal solution.
In determining who the town representatives should be, three
competing factors come into play. First, the representatives should
come with some authority to speak on behalf of the town. Second,
they should have approximately equal weight within the town.
Third, they should be representative of the town's populace, not
only its government.
That the representatives must be able to speak on behalf of the
town is self-evident. Less clear, however, is on what issues the representatives must have authority to speak. As described earlier, the
RHL must be viewed as a forum in which issues other than housing
are to be negotiated. A representative must be able to speak with
some degree of authority about what promises her town will be
able to make. Second, unless the authority of the representative is
pre-designated, some towns will have greater bargaining ability
than others, depending on the position of the town's representative within town government. Worse, under proper circumstances
382.
383.

See Susskind & Podziba, supra note 271, at 20-21.
See id. at 13.
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a given town could disrupt the negotiations within the RHL by
sending a representative with little authority.
One option is to provide for directly-elected representatives. It is
important that the representative have a direct relationship with
his constituents; direct election of the representative by the town
residents will maximize the degree to which the popular voice is
heard. The election might carry with it a seat on the town council.
Where representatives represent districts within a large town or
central city,3 4 the position should include membership on the city

council for each district's representative.
A second, perhaps more practical, alternative might involve designating an existing official, such as the town planner, to serve on
the RHL. By choosing this option, the RHL could be instantly established, without the need for prior elections. Assuming the
designated official is popularly elected by town residents, the subsequent election might become a referendum on the official's
performance on the RHL. This solution might require a single
representative per town, with weighted voting, as described in the
next section. Alternatively, direction might be taken from SCAG,
which is composed of city councilors who are elected by the town
and city councils themselves. s' Since the city councilor who is ultimately chosen to be RHL representative is directly elected, the
direct responsibility of the representative to her constituents is not
compromised with this approach.
The size of the RHL presents additional considerations. For instance, consider a metropolitan region in which the smallest town
has a population of 2,000 and the total population for the region is
3 million. If each town must have at least one representative, then
there must be one representative per 2,000 residents, or 1,500 representatives.3s6 A legislature composed of 1,500 representatives may

be inefficient. If necessary, the size of the RHL might be limited by
providing for fractional votes. Small, neighboring suburbs would
agree to send a single representative; the town sending the representative would rotate every year. The representative would be
entitled to cast fractional votes on behalf of each of the towns he
represents. On most matters, the towns should be grouped so that
384. See infra Part III.D.2.
385. Telephone Interview with Rusty Selix, supra note 363.
386. Indeed, it may be worse than these numbers suggest. Suppose the next largest
town has 2,500 individuals. In order to adhere to principles of one-person, one-vote, there
must now be one representative for every 500 residents; the smallest town would have four
representatives and the next would have five. The total number of representatives for a metropolitan area with a population of 3 million is now 6,000.
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their interests will coincide, and fractional voting will not be necessary. But a difference in opinion between the towns on any
particular issue should be represented in the legislature.
2. At-Large Districts vs. Winner-Takes-All vs. Appointment by Town
Council-Each municipality in the RHL should have voting power
proportionate to its population. There are at least four ways to accomplish this. 3s7 First, larger municipalities may be divided into
districts, with elections in each district on a winner-takes-all basis.
Second, each locality may send one representative, with more
populous cities' votes weighing more than smaller towns. Third,
these possibilities may be combined by providing that each municipality elect a number of representatives proportionate to its
population, without these representatives being elected from a
given district.
In the abstract, the first approach is best suited for this proposal.
It is important that the beneficiaries of the affordable housing have
a direct voice on the RHL. In particular, it is important to divide
the central city into districts in order to assure that the interests of
the poor are directly represented. Since the urban poor do not
vote in large numbers s3 s citywide at-large elections will primarily
generate representatives of the middle classes. Single-member districts resolve this problem by ensuring that, even if voter turnout is
low in the poor districts, at least these representatives owe their
election to that constituency alone. Moreover, campaigns to organize and raise awareness among the urban poor are more likely to
succeed where their votes directly matter.
There are two potential drawbacks. First, the central city's bargaining power may be diminished if it is factionalized. Second,
district-wide voting is practically more difficult to establish. A system in which one representative is designated from each town and
according voting power proportional to the town's population
could be established quickly. The adequacy of this solution would
depend on to what degree the central city delegates adequately
represent the interests of the urban poor.389
3. Background Rules, and Cost of Exit-This Note's proposal is
premised upon a carefully balanced negotiation among towns,
wherein it is anticipated that coalitions will form among central
387.

See Frug, supra note 15, at 1801-05.
See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE,
162-63 (1988).
389. However, another benefit of the districting approach is that it is less susceptible to
being "bought out" by regional contribution agreements, wherein the money is not spent in
the inner city. See infra Part III.D.4.
388.

WINTER

2004]

Democratizingthe American Dream

city and inner suburbs, and among further suburbs. By providing
for voting weighted by population, not only is democratic legitimacy preserved, but the central city is given a greater degree of
bargaining power than it would have if each municipality were
given only one vote. Still, its greater bargaining power would be
useless unless the state establishes default rules, attaching a high
cost to R-L inaction. One background rule might require each
municipality to set aside an equal percentage of its developable
land for affordable housing. A background rule may then be modified by negotiation in the RHL. The RHL may either modify the
rule in specific cases, or it may amend the rule wholesale.
The equal-percentage rule exemplified above would provide
strong incentives to negotiate. However, it may not be realistic to
expect a state legislature to promulgate such a rule. One alternative might be to institute a program closely patterned on
Massachusetts' chapter 40B appeals statute, the provisions of which

are suspended for any municipality whose comprehensive plan is
certified by the RHL. Since Massachusetts' 40B statute is universally
despised among suburban municipalities, this would serve as an
impetus for all municipalities tojumpstart the RHL.
The importance of setting a background rule is exemplified by
the Connecticut compact experience. It will be recalled that, early
on in the negotiation, Hartford suggested that, if other municipalities took care of their own local affordable housing shortfall,
Hartford would take care of its own.3 9° The suburbs were therefore
3 91
relieved of the responsibility of addressing "Hartford's problem."
This seems like an enormous concession, one which undermines
any potential dispersive effect of suburban affordable housing.
Moreover, the fact that affordable housing was largely seen as
"Hartford's problem" casts serious doubt on whether the representatives truly saw affordable housing as a regional issue. The
Connecticut negotiations not only lacked democratic representation but, more importantly, they also lacked a definitive
background rule that would get everyone motivated about reaching a lasting solution. Affordable housing was Hartford's problem

because state law did not make it the suburbs' problem. Had the
state said, "agree or be subject to a strict fair share standard," Hartford would not have needed to concede as much as it did.
4. Regional Contribution Agreements-Flexibility in the RHL is de-

sirable to allow for meaningful negotiation. Representatives will
390.
391.

SUSSKIND & PODZIBA,

Id.

supra note 271, at 7.
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have stronger bargaining power if they can offer deals tangentially
related to housing.39 But with flexibility comes the specter of New
Jersey's regional contribution agreements (RCAs). What is to prevent a central city, mired in financial difficulty, from selling its
"right" to require suburbs to build their fair share of affordable
housing? Yet if it does so, one of the goals of this proposal, that of
dispersing concentrated poverty, is eliminated. Instead, suburbs
pay for the right to continue to exclude.
Some would argue that the RHL should be able to do exactly
that. For instance, the RHL may decide that it is impractical to pursue a dispersal strategy, and that reinvestment in the central city is
a better way to provide for the poor inner-city residents. In this
case, the RHL may elect to allow payments from the suburbs in lieu
of the actual creation of housing.
However, there is an enormous potential for abuse. The differential between the bargaining power of the city and the suburb is
typically enormous. In New Jersey, cash-strapped inner cities often
must accept RCA money, although they would much prefer to see
housing built in the suburbs.9 3 Indeed, the central cities may be
tempted to settle for much less money than it would cost the suburbs to build the housing, simply because the incremental benefit
to the cities of having suburbs build housing that may or may not
relieve the city's own housing problems is dwarfed by the certain
benefit of cash in hand.
This problem may be addressed in an RHL that employs districted representatives from the central city instead of at-large
representatives. Suburbs would reach regional contribution
agreements, not with the central city, but with the representatives
from the transferee district. Thus, if suburb X wishes to transfer
affordable housing to district Y of the central city, suburb X will
reach an agreement with district Y, not with the central city. Payment becomes somewhat more tricky: it is unlikely that district Y
has an independent treasury. However, the district need not accept
payment personally. It may instead provide that payment be made
to a local community housing organization committed to improving housing and community services in the district. Thus, the fact
that the urban poor are directly represented in the RHL proves

392. At least a tangential relationship should be required, however. It would be inappropriate for substantive town policies to be made, having nothing to do with housing,
through negotiations conducted in the RHL. Otherwise the RHL becomes a general legislature, the merits of which are beyond the scope of this Note.
393. See McDougall, RCA, supra note 50, at 686-89.
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advantageous in mitigating one of the more pernicious practical
aspects of regional contribution agreements.
5. Structuringthe Appellate Level as a Microcosm of the RHL--Given

its likely size and numerous other responsibilities, the RHL could
not possibly hear all appeals from all decisions of all local zoning
boards. It would be advantageous to have an intermediate appellate tribunal, with the full RHL hearing appeals from that tribunal
only on a discretionary basis. Constructing this tribunal is complicated, however, since the RHL is composed not of disinterested
judges but rather of partisan advocates.
One possibility would be to constitute an appellate tribunal of
impartial administrative law judges, who would review decisions of
the local zoning boards on the basis of RHL regulations and decisions. The benefit of this is approach is its evident simplicity. The
downside is that, even in its judicial function, the RHL is intended
to be a political body. While it may not fundamentally change the
law when acting as a tribunal, it may interpret the law to the same
extent a court would. This act of common-law interpretation is informed by the interests of represented communities. This interestbased decision-making is lost, at least at the appellate level, where
the judges are not RHL representatives.
The second, more difficult approach is to attempt to constitute
an appellate level that is a microcosm of the full RHL. One possible approach follows: When creating the RHL, the state legislature
may divide the towns into subregions. Ideally, the subregions would
be relatively economically homogenous-so that exurbs are generally grouped together, and inner ring suburbs are grouped
together. It is permissible for a town to be part of more than one
subregion; this could happen if a town's socioeconomic makeup
fell between two different groups. Moreover, districts within a locality need not be placed within the same subregions, and subregions
need not even be contiguous. The important point is that they exhibit some commonality as to their residents' preferences
regarding affordable housing.
To amplify the point a bit further, one mechanical way to create
the subregions would be as follows: Each district, 20% or more of
whose housing stock is affordable, is to be grouped in one subregion. Those districts in which affordable housing represents more
than 10% and less than 20% of the overall housing stock may be
grouped in a separate subregion-and so on. This model presumes
that towns with similar amounts of affordable housing have similar
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preferences with respect to the extent to which affordable housing
should be distributed through the region.
The appellate tribunal, then, could be constituted by choosing a
random representative from each subregion to be part of the appellate panel. The only exception would be that a district's
representative would not be permitted to hear an appeal arising
out of his or her own district:

94

If five subregions are created, then

the appellate panel would consist of five representatives, and would
constitute an approximate microcosm of the full RHL.
6. Arriving at Neutral FairShare Numbers Without SacrificingPoliti-

cal Accountability--One important strength of COAH in New Jersey
is its ability to reliably conduct studies and arrive at technically accurate numbers for the regional need for affordable housing.
While, as noted earlier, the determination of the methodology for
ascertaining regional and local housing need is a political question, and should be conducted by the RHL itself, the technical,

ministerial task of conducting the required surveys and arriving at
hard numbers can, and probably should, be delegated to a neutral,
expert administrative agency. This approach will free the RHL
from being required to hold fact-finding hearings regarding the
state of the housing market in the region. At the same time, it will
reserve to the RHL the ability to make substantive policy choices.
Finally, the RHL will not be bound to accept the administrative
agency's numbers; and even if it accepts them in principle, it is free
to allocate housing goals in a manner inconsistent with what would
be suggested by the agency's numbers.
The administrative agency may also be of assistance to the RHL
in arriving at a methodology. The fundamental policy questions are
still political, but there are numerous complex variables that may
enter into the decision of how much affordable housing a given
region or municipality "needs." Thus, the RHL would likely call
upon the administrative agency to conduct a preliminary study and
present a proposed methodology for ascertaining regional and local affordable housing need. The RHL would have the right to
question the authors of the report, and could adjust the methodology as it sees fit, or substitute its own. It would then ask the
agency to determining actual housing need, using the RHL's
methodology.
Another important question that will arise relates to the definition of affordability. This is clearly a policy issue that goes to the
394. A district representative might, however, hear an appeal arising out of another district in the same municipality.
395. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
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heart of the RHL's mandate. Too expansive a definition would lead
to an unwarranted expansion in the RHL's power and a decrease
in the amount of "truly" affordable housing created in the region.
Too narrow a definition would lead to the marginalization of the
RHL and, again, a decrease in the number of affordable units
built, as it becomes unprofitable for developers to create such lowpriced units.
The RHL should not be entitled to provide its own definition of
affordability. The definition must come from the state to ensure
statewide consistency and to prevent the RHL from defining away
the term and thereby becoming a general land-use policy board. 96
However, there is no reason the state legislature may not provide a
range or alternatives, such as: "An affordable unit shall be a unit
for which a family earning up to 80 % of the regionalor local median

income would spend no more than up to 33% of its annual income
on rent (or mortgage payments, assuming a 30-year mortgage)."
The RHL would then be entitled to choose a number in each of
the italicized ranges, and would be entitled to decide whether the
median income is to be measured on a regional or a local scale.
This solution provides an acceptable amount of discretion on the
part of the RHL to provide for the truly needy individuals in the
region without allowing it to expand its jurisdiction without limit.
7. Adversary Proceedings-An important goal of this proposal is

to have localities work together to reach a commonly acceptable
solution to a regional problem, rather than having a solution imposed upon them from an outside source. An appeals statute's
reliance on adversary proceedings seems to be at odds with this
goal.
In order to further this goal of dispute resolution in a nonadversarial setting, the RHL might mandate mediation following
any local denial of a permit to build affordable housing. This program might be patterned on the mediation provided by COAH
prior to the institution of formal adjudicatory proceedings in New
Jersey. The goal of the mediation would be to find a mechanism by
which the development could go forward, with conditions that
would satisfy the municipality but not render the development
economically infeasible.
396. There is nothing theoretically wrong with this; indeed, in Oregon, the LCDC is
charged with regulating all housing decisions, not only decisions relating to affordable housing. But if the intent is to provide a narrow focus on ameliorating the affordable housing
situation, it makes sense to require the RHL to stay focused by providing a definition of
affordability.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 37:2

It is important that the resulting agreement conform with the
regional policies set forth by the RHL. For instance, an acceptable
outcome would not be for the municipality to pay the developer
whatever it might have earned in rent from the next five years, in
exchange for the developer not proceeding with the construction.
In order to prevent this contingency, a disinterested member of
the RHL might be made a party to the mediation proceedings; all
parties' consent must be obtained in order for the mediation to be
deemed successful. Moreover, municipalities may be subject to
strict liability if they do not create sufficient affordable housing;
this would eliminate many opportunities for the sort of bribery described above.
8. Racial Integration-How to effect desegregation is a persistently difficult question, and clearly the proposal embodied in this
Note cannot suffice to reverse the centuries of discrimination that
have resulted in a highly segregated urban landscape. Raceconscious mechanisms are probably required, as few programs
aimed solely at economic desegregation have achieved any measure of success at racial integration. 7
That said, the structure of the RHL would represent a move in
the right direction with respect to both economic and racial desegregation. If one of the causes of racial segregation is a lack of
information available to inner city residents about housing and
jobs in the suburbs, the RHL representatives, who are anticipated
to be active members of their local communities, will fill important
roles in bringing home the news of new opportunities. They may
inform their constituents about a suburb that has agreed to proactively construct low-income housing. Or, they may report that,
following mediation, a particular community has come to support
a moderate-income project. In this way, the representative's would
supplement any minority marketing programs the RHL might institute.
Moreover, as noted earlier, the very fact that community support
is actively sought out in the production of low-income housing will
be important in encouraging racial minorities to move into the
sites. Evidence that the new community will be welcoming is crucial
to desegregation. This evidence will more likely be forthcoming
when the new community is included in the decision-making process.
9. Administrative vs. Legislative Nature-Up to this point, the. description of the proposal has avoided a central structural question:
397.

See Roisman, supra note 2, at 95.
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whether the RHL is an agency or a legislative body. It has many of
the attributes of an agency--particularly its limited subject matter
jurisdiction and its violation of separation of powers.9 At the same
time, it is a representative body with some authority to negotiate
about matters not within its scope of concentration, so long as the
matters are related to (or will have an effect on) housing. These
attributes make the RHL look more like a regional legislature.
When determining the level of deference and scope of review
given by a court to RHL actions, the RHL's status might need to be
clarified.
On the one hand, the RHL is a body with authority clearly circumscribed by its "organic statute"-like an agency. Thus, courts
are needed to ascertain whether the RHL has exceeded the
bounds of its authorization. Under this view, a court may defer to
the RHL in the interpretation of its organic statute, and it may presume that RHL action is legitimate, while reserving to the court
ultimate authority to interpret the RHL's organic statute. Additionally, if there is a state analog to the federal Administrative
Procedures Act,

99

a court might be required to determine whether

an RHL rule is "arbitrary and capricious. 40 0 Of course, this should
not represent an insurmountable burden, but it is still a higher
burden than that imposed on legislatures.
On the other hand, the RHL may be analogized to a county or
municipal government. Local governments, under modern statements of the law, are "creatures of the state," and derive all of their
authority from the state.' Indeed, local governments can only act
where there is a specific state law authorizing them to act. 40 2 Under

this view, the task courts undertake in reviewing RHL actions for
consistency with its organic statute is no different in kind than the
task they undertake in ascertaining whether state statutes conform
with the state or federal constitution, or whether local governments have acted beyond the scope of their authority, or in
contravention of a state statute. This is a highly deferential standard.

398. See supranote 306 and accompanying text.
399. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
400. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2000).
401. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161,178 (1907).
402. See, e.g., 1JOHN DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237(89) (1911), reprinted in
GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 140-41 (3d ed. 2001).
403. See supraPart I.A.
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On balance, the RHL bears more resemblance to a local legislature than to an agency. This is primarily due to its representative
character. Courts defer to legislatures because they are democratic
bodies, whereas courts, and agencies, are not. Courts may feel entitled to override agencies on appropriate matters, where the courts
feel equally qualified. However, a court is rarely equally qualified as
a representative body, since the body is presumed to speak with the
legitimacy of the people.
Given this analysis, there should be no general right to appeal
RHL-created rules to a court of general jurisdiction, just as one
cannot appeal an amendment to the city code. °4 By contrast, RHL
judicial decisions should be appealable to the state's highest court.
The RHL is more severely constrained by its own precedents and
prior enactments when it functions as an adjudicatory body; its decisions are therefore much more amenable to review by a neutral
body. Moreover, in such a situation, constitutional due process issues may arise; the state supreme court and the United States
Supreme Court must be given an opportunity to ensure that litigants are given a fair hearing before being deprived of substantive
rights .4
10. Middle-Class Flight--Suburban residents often cite fear of
falling property values as a primary reason for opposing the construction of affordable housing within their jurisdiction. An
appeals statute regime exacerbates this fear; if a developer chooses
to build a large affordable housing project in a particular town, the
town's perception will be that the residents will all move to a
neighboring town with less affordable housing. Moreover, a town
in Massachusetts' affordable housing regime is confronted with a
prisoner's dilemma with respect to whether it should try to meet
the 10% requirement. If it does meet the requirement, it will be
exempt from the statute, but it may fear that all its upper-middle
class residents will have fled due to the high amount of affordable
housing. If it does not meet the requirement, then it will be subject
to the uncertainty of the builder's remedy. But, if all towns in Massachusetts somehow simultaneously created 10% affordable
404. Certainly, would-be litigants are free to seek an injunction against those who would
enforce RHL enactments to the same extent as they would seek to enjoin any other state or
local action. For instance, one might sue on ultra vires grounds, claiming that the RHL acted
beyond the scope of its authority under its enabling statute.
405. An interesting dilemma may arise relating to compulsory claims and counterclaims. If a developer has other related state-law claims against a municipality (or its zoning
board), or, somehow, the zoning board has counterclaims against a municipality, the RHL is
not the appropriate forum to litigate these disputes. The claims must be separately litigated
in a state's regular courts.
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housing, then all would be better off. There would be no middleclass flight because there would be nowhere in the metropolitan
area to flee to. Thus, a prisoner's dilemma is presented: A town will
create affordable housing, up to the 10% level, only if it can be assured that all other towns are doing the same.
A centralized planning regime is better in that the state can ensure widespread compliance. However, the disempowerment of the
locality in such an approach means that each suburb must depend
on the state to ensure that it and its neighbors are subject to exactly the same affordable housing requirements. Otherwise, even
minute differences will result in middle class flight.
Under this Note's approach, suburbs police each other. The
prisoner's dilemma is resolved, not by centralized intervention, but
by the possibility of a binding, enforceable agreement among the
suburbs. Given a proper background rule, the result will be a regulatory "race to the middle." Once the substantive standard is set,
outer suburbs will be interested in protecting their property values
by monitoring their neighbors to ensure that they create their appropriate share of affordable housing.

CONCLUSION

This Note has presented a structural approach to solving a very
difficult problem. The vast literature devoted to proposals to encourage the creation of affordable housing, and critiques of those
proposals, is a testament to the pressing nature of the problem to
be solved. The various experiments described in Parts I and II provide evidence that there is at least some political will to solve it. Yet
the scope of the attempts is woefully inadequate. Most of the statutes described in Part I were adopted over three decades ago. Very
little real-world experimentation has happened since. 406

In part, this failure of imagination has been a result of the political inertia that must be overcome in order to pass a major
program through a state legislature. In a field as uncertain as the
creation of affordable housing, where no one has discovered a sub-

406.
tions.

San Diego's pilot program and Connecticut's compact program are two excep-
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stantive solution that is both politically palatable and actually
works,0 7 the inertia is fatal.
If regional housing legislatures, on this or another model, were
established in metropolitan areas across the country, this Note asserts that we would see a great increase in the amount of
experimentation in housing policy. Such bodies would be less subject to inertia for two reasons. First, since the housing legislature
concentrates only on housing issues, it cannot be sidetracked by
other legislative agendas. Second, even if a given housing legislature failed to pass a given proposal, the discussion might be
sufficient to serve as an inspiration to another housing legislature.
A proliferation of such bodies would lead to an explosion of practical ideas, cross-fertilization of those ideas, and a greater amount
of experimentation overall.
There will always be debate as to whether our system of local
government law should provide for the needs of the poor at the
expense of the middle class, or vice versa. Luckily, the choice is not
so stark. Working together, with bargaining power allocated according to population, but with no town's interests unheeded,
municipalities should be able to address the regional need for affordable housing. This goal can be accomplished so that no one is,
on the whole, worse off, if municipalities are given a forum within
which they may negotiate, each from a position of strength. In this
way, a regional housing legislature could effect meaningful change
for the most disadvantaged members of society.

407. Montgomery County's solution may fall into the latter category; but, given that it
would entail the elimination of local governments, it would not be a serious option in most
metropolitan areas.

